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Regulatory opportunities and constraints facing private 
sector biodiversity conservation outside protected areas 
 
A South African perspective 
 
 
Any governance system that is designed to regulate complex biological systems must have 
as much variety in the actions that it can take as there exists in the systems being 
regulated. This is a tall order, but it is one to which we need to pay serious attention. 
Unfortunately, much of contemporary policy analysis does not base recommendations on 
the law of requisite variety. (Ostrom 2001: 781)1 
 
 
I    INTRODUCTION 
 
Biodiversity2  comprises the variation of living species on earth upon which its human 
population depends for survival.3 This is so because diversity maintains biospheric 
conditions without which human life, integrally tied up with all other forms of life on 
earth, would become extinct. Related to its life-sustaining properties, biodiversity’s 
capacity sustains the provision of a valuable set of natural resources that includes water, 
food and medicinal materials. In addition biodiversity is accorded intrinsic value because 
a growing number of individuals believe that mankind has an ethical obligation to 
conserve every other form of life on earth. Humans are one of numerous species who 
occupy space on earth, together comprising an environment upon which the diversity and 
survival of all species are dependent. Viewed historically these are relatively new 
intellectual and belief systems. 
 
It is argued that such global considerations are particularly pertinent in South Africa 
because of its status as the third biologically most diverse country in the world.4 The 
World Heritage Site designation of the Cape Floral Kingdom in the Western Cape, for 
example, is based on the exceptionally high biological diversity of the area.5 Also of 
                                                 
1
 E Ostrom  ‘Institutional diversity of commons’ (2001) Encyclopaedia of Biodiversity, Volume 1, S Levin 
editor, San Diego: Academic Press, 777-791. 
2
 Although its definition remains unsettled in the judgment of certain researchers, probably a minority, 
biodiversity is commonly defined as comprising three interrelated levels of environmental phenomena. 
Moving from small to large scale, these are genetic diversity, species diversity and ecosystem diversity. The 
National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 in South Africa and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity 31 International Legal Materials, for instance, adopt this position when they define the 
concept as ‘the variability among living organisms from all sources including terrestrial, marine, and other 
aquatic ecosystems and other ecological complexes of which they are a part and also includes diversity 
within species, between species, and of ecosystems’. 
3
 D Clark and D Downes ‘What price biodiversity? Economics and biodiversity conservation in the United 
States’ (1985) 11 Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 9.  
4
 World Conservation Monitoring Centre ‘Global biodiversity status of the earths living resources’(1992). 
5
 Of the 18 000 plant species occurring in South Africa, 80 percent occur nowhere else in the world (White 
Paper on the Conservation and Use of South Africa’s Biodiversity (in GN 1095 GG 18163 of 28 July 1997) 
at 12). 
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particular importance to South Africa, given the sizeable proportion of its population that 
is poor by most criteria, is the recognition of biodiversity as a prerequisite to achieving 
sustainable development.6  
 
But traditional approaches to biodiversity conservation have not achieved levels of 
protection for biodiversity in South Africa judged adequate in the research community. 
The current status of the country’s biodiversity is considered one of the most threatened 
on the planet.7 Commentators have identified a range of reasons for this.8 Shortcomings 
in the current protected areas policy regime,9 as well as provision for the listing of species 
under threat, 10 and limitations of the command and control regulatory system within 
which these approaches are couched, constrain the reach of such traditional approaches.  
 
Within what can be termed the traditional approach, policy actions have been weighted 
towards the extension of protected areas. The precarious status of ecosystems and of 
particular species both inside and outside protected areas11 has been attributed partially to 
a protected areas framework functioning ineffectively.12 In consequence, the recent 
emphasis in policy shifts aimed at biodiversity conservation has been to right these 
deficiencies within protected areas designation and management practice.13 Although 
species listings do form part of this entrenched approach, in order to keep the scale of this 
paper within reasonable bounds they are excluded from the discussion of policy 
background in sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.   
 
What promotes inertia in retaining the traditional approach is the high proportion of 
private ownership14 of the land upon which biological resources exist, because 88 
                                                 
6
 D Farrier ‘Conserving biodiversity on private land: incentives for management and compensation for lost 
expectations?’ (1995) 19 Harvard Environmental LR 303 at 305; P Sands Principles of International 
Environmental Law 2 ed (2003) 499-501. 
7
 R Wynberg ‘ A decade of biodiversity conservation and use in South Africa: tracking progress from Rio 
Earth Summit to the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development’ (2002) 98 South African 
Journal of Science. 
8
 These will be elaborated in following sections. 
9
 Protected areas as the sole device for biodiversity conservation is proving too limited in scope. Therefore 
the need to protect biodiversity outside proclaimed protected areas can be argued as increasingly 
recognised in policy forums, in South Africa as elsewhere. 
10
 Conservation efforts include a number of laws that list various species of fauna or flora in respect of 
which certain activities are regulated. For instance, the National Forest Act (84 of 1988) (Chap 3 Part 3) 
and Western Cape Nature Conservation Laws Amendment (Act 3 of 2000). Licenses are generally required 
for undertaking activities that may impact on listed species. 
11
 According to the National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment 2004: Priorities for biodiversity conservation 
in South Africa, Strelitzia 17 South African National Biodiversity Institute, ix – xiiii, 34 per cent of 
terrestrial ecosystems, 82 per cent of signature rivers and 65 per cent of marine bio-zones are classified as 
threatened. 
12
 See Board of Investigation into the Institutional Arrangements for Nature Conservation in South Africa: 
Report (Kumleben Report, 1998), 9-10. 
13
 See the White Paper on Biodiversity and the Kumleben Report, 1998 supra (note 12). 
14
 The private sector comprises owners as individual persons as well as companies or corporate entities that 
undertake for profit a range of activities. These comprise fishing, mining, mariculture and stock farming, 
with plantation forestry, agriculture and urban expansion being the most environmentally threatening 
pursuits. The benefits sought from the land to which private interests have access can often not be obtained 
in a manner that is sustainable, as we have come to learn in recent decades. In Section Two this is put down 
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percent15 of all land in South Africa is privately owned.16 Thus to extend conservation 
coverage it is necessary to co-opt private sector support for biodiversity conservation on a 
scale that appears unrealistic.  
 
With the Government lacking financial resources to buy private land in significant 
quantities for conservation purposes, other policy instruments should be sought for 
ongoing conservation on land under private ownership.17 In the current situation, where 
protected areas have too limited an impact on the problem, alternative instruments that 
function outside protected areas merit investigation.  
 
Although command and control approaches have clear weaknesses this dissertation 
proposes that the wholesale adoption of an incentive-based approach to environmental 
regulation on its own is not alone the key.  At base the success of environmental 
restoration depends on the existence of a well functioning regulatory framework. This 
would be more effective and far-reaching in function if it were to be expanded and 
diversified into a hybrid system; that is, one which includes both regulation and 
incentive-creation devices.  
 
In section two the limitations of the existing approach to biodiversity conservation in 
South Africa are discussed. The drawbacks to relying predominantly on protected area 
mechanisms and a command and control regulatory system are assessed. Proposals are 
then made regarding the extension of current policy as a platform18 to secure a greater 
rate and volume of biodiversity conservation. This section concludes by demonstrating 
the need for policies that sustain biodiversity not only inside protected areas but also 
outside them. 
 
A range of environmental attributes are recognized as integral to a given region’s 
biodiversity. Human-initiated activities impact adversely on these attributes.19 
Consequently the range of application within which remedial instruments need to operate 
is also wide. Section three examines legal mechanisms available to conserve biodiversity 
                                                                                                                                                 
to private individuals acting in their own self interest, with the current regulatory approach lacking scope to 
turn their incentives and behaviour towards environmental protection.   
15
 The Department of Land Affairs has released statistics stating the proportion of the surface area of South 
Africa owned by the state as twelve percent. See ‘Box 5.3’ at 
http://land.pwv.gov.za/White%20paper/white7.htm#Public%20land. 
16
 Along with most countries we thus have a situation where private individuals own the bulk of the land in 
South Africa, with the remainder in the public domain, either state or collectively owned by communities. 
17
 Although protected area mechanisms have played an integral role in restoring and enhancing biodiversity 
in many parts of the world, there are persuasive arguments that the unutilised scope for private action in 
conservation has the potential to be broader in application. 
18
 It is important to note here that policy currently identifies certain factors essential to secure biodiversity 
conservation. Thus the focus is more on implementing and developing the insights that already exist rather 
than departing from them.  
19
 This range of impacts is extensive and usually negative in effect. Biological variation is open to an 
extremely wide set of influences some of which result from human activities. Exploitation includes actions 
that take materials directly out of the environment, like natural resource use, while other actions affect 
biodiversity indirectly through industry, farming and habitat modification. The latter tend to change 
habitats in the longer term, sometimes only with a time lag, and thereby constrain biodiversity in a more 
indirect way. 
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under national and sectoral environmental legislation. It weighs up what is hypothetically 
available20 against what is feasible to implement.21 These mechanisms are analysed in 
terms of (1) why they are relevant, (2) their possible forms in implementation, (3) what 
regulatory opportunities exist for their use in South Africa, and (4) their likely 
weaknesses and the options available for their reform. Certain instances are discussed in 
greater detail where specific examples can illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the 
mechanism in question.  
 
Incentive devices are required to produce conservation awareness in private owners. This 
is not just for designating protected areas, but in order to foster biodiversity conservation 
on a wider front. In the overall design of environmental management regimes, regulation 
tends to follow command-and-control lines. Thus the likelihood is low of private 
landowners initiating responsibility for conserving the commonly owned22 environmental 
attributes of their land in the absence of incentives provided for them to do so.  
 
In section four possible incentive opportunities and constraints are discussed. At the 
outset key criteria are identified that broadly frame the analysis of the incentive forms 
considered. Within the spectrum of incentives discussed, however, specific attention is 
paid to economic incentives. This is because it is evident from the referenced literature 
that the bulk of international and domestic attention on policy in recent years has focused 
on this category. 
 
The implementation of incentive-based approaches is in its infancy in South Africa. 
Putting into operation certain policy levers compatible with the legislation is wholly 
preliminary,23  so practical drawbacks remain difficult to gauge. Thus potential 
hindrances to implementation in South Africa have to be derived from a set of theoretical 
considerations, which is a second best procedure but not avoidable.  
 
Section five concludes by arguing that a particular combination of policy actions - that is, 
combining a specific regulatory mechanism with an appropriate incentive for private 
agents - may be better suited to the South African situation than are others.     
 
2   LIMITATIONS OF THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO BIODIVERSITY     
      CONSERVATION 
 
2.1 Reliance on command and control 
 
At the outset a broad distinction needs to be drawn between direct intervention, known as 
command-and-control mechanisms to regulate action, and incentive devices like 
                                                 
20
 This is synthesised from a survey of international literature. 
21
 Based upon consideration of the current statutory framework and the mechanisms that exist therein. 
22
 To clarify, all biological resources in a national jurisdiction are in the Public Trust and therefore need to 
be conserved in the public interest. So the government at any time regulates use and access to them, but this 
has to be done with the interests of the people in mind, present as well as future generations. Clearly these 
can entail multiple sources of potential conflict which are not pursued in this thesis. 
23
 Certain problems of implementation are probably not yet foreseeable. 
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economic levers which encourage or discourage certain kinds of behaviour. Command 
and control systems by their nature are state-centred. In South Africa, as in most 
countries, this translates into construction of a legal basis for intervention. 
 
Regulation prescribes a range of objectives and standards for enforcement by state 
agencies. In South Africa the avenues for enforcement are delimited by the range of 
possible administrative and criminal measures treated in recent literature.24 In contrast, 
incentive-based instruments discussed in section four operate on the presupposition that 
in order to achieve environmental objectives it is usually more efficient and effective to 
reward positive behaviour than to sanction negative behaviour.25  
 
Despite the problems in command-and-control mechanisms, being their tendency to 
inflexibility, high administrative costs, excessive imposition of regulatory responsibility, 
and reaction to rather than anticipation of problems, these measures have acquired 
historical dominance in the regulation of private behaviour for environmental goals.26 But 
in recent decades increasing numbers of national administrations have realised the need 
for other approaches. 27   
 
One general contention by certain environmental researchers28  is that the preferred 
strategy should be to identify first the origin of the particular environmental problem at 
hand and then to devise legislative instruments to mould behaviour towards addressing 
the problem. However, regulations are often formed in response to public health and 
safety concerns as they surface over a particular issue, and therefore tend to be piecemeal 
in their formulation and environmental impact.29 In such cases, command and control 
                                                 
24
  For discussion of these measures see M Kidd ‘Alternatives to the criminal sanction in the enforcement of 
environmental law’ (2002) 9 South African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 21. These include 
fines, imprisonment, community service, rehabilitation orders, presumptions of responsibility, civil cost 
recovery, legal cost recovery; strict liability, employee liability, vicarious liability, director liability, and 
private prosecution. Examples of administrative measures would be directives; submission of 
environmental management plan requirements; environmental reporting obligations; and environmental 
impact assessment (EIA), amongst a range of others. 
25
 The earliest justification of this approach was that by A Pigou in his book The economics of welfare 
(1920)  Macmillan, London. He argued that providing incentives and information for individuals, 
organizations and industries to internalise the costs of their actions (social as well as environmental) was 
the solution to solving the market’s failure to do so adequately.  See also, R Stavins Environmental 
Economics (2007) National Bureau of Economic Research: Working Paper 13574 at 1; A Jaffe, R Newell 
and R Stavins ‘A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and Environmental Policy’ (2005) 54 
Ecological Economics 164 at 165-166 and 171-174; and R Stauth and P Baskind ‘Chapter 3: Resource 
Economics’ in R Fuggle and A Rabie (eds) Environmental Concerns in South Africa (1992) at 27-52. 
26
 Kidd ‘Criminal sanctions’ (supra note 24). 
27
 This has occurred within the last 25 years. See J Harlan ‘Environmental Policies in the New Millenium: 
Incentive-Based Approaches to Environmental Management and Ecosystem Stewardship’ (2000) 
Conference Summary. World Resources Institute, Washington DC. 
28
 R Hahn and R Stavins ‘Incentive Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?’ 
(1991) 18 Ecology Law Quarterly 1 at 4-7 and 12-15.  
29
 K Wilkie ‘What’s in it for me? - Exploring Natural Capital Incentives’ (2005) Summary Report of the 
Natural Capital Incentives Initiative, Canada West Foundation, Canada. 
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mechanisms are often reactions to specific environmental problems,30 whereas incentive-
based tools have greater potential to be anticipatory in function.31     
 
Incentive based instruments can provide an approach to regulation that is more efficient 
than command and control.32 The rationale for this assertion lies in the claim, as stated 
above, that rewarding positive behaviour is more effective than sanctioning negative 
behaviour.33 Incentive devices can be resource-saving and therefore attractive to 
governments facing severe resource constraints like South Africa.34 The successful 
shifting of conservation responsibilities to private agents in their pursuit of self interest 
can decrease resource costs for the same output or, for the same costs, can increase output 
in volume or value, or both.35 In both instances there is an efficiency gain.  
 
In terms of flexibility, incentive-based approaches are asserted to deal better with the 
complexity of considerations that environmental issues entail.36 One such source of 
complexity attaches to private biodiversity conservation. If incentive creation can be 
designed to reward the achievement of specific environmental goals scope may be 
created for innovation in the exploitation of natural resources combined with preservation 
of biodiversity.37 Enterprises, in accordance with their profit-seeking nature, look for new 
cheaper ways to achieve environmental obligations. Whereas command and control 
approaches, with human decisions prescribed by regulation, may because of this design 
feature inhibit innovation.38 But this is tentative because the needed research is complex 
and incomplete. In South Africa this observation39 has particular pertinence as the lack of 
capacity in many levels of government means that if the private sector takes more 
responsibility40 for conservation the state can play a lesser role in doing so.41    
                                                 
30
 For instance, command and control approaches focus on righting consequences through prohibition. Say 
a resource user engages in activity ‘A’ without a permit, then they will face penalty ‘B’. But this does not 
deal with the preferences of the resource user in engaging in activity A in the first place. Top-down control 
also provides no motivation and reward for initiative which means that individuals will constantly be 
looking for ways to get around rigid regulation rather than seeing it as a personal gain proactively to take 
measures.   
31
 It needs to be noted though that both approaches are geared to deal with specific environmental 
problems, whether these problems are currently being experienced or are likely to emerge in the future 
based on assessment of the current state of affairs. 
32
 R Stavins ‘Environmental Economics’ (2007) National Bureau of Economic Research: Working Paper 
13574 at 9-10. 
33
 R Stauth and P Baskind ‘Chapter 3: Resource Economics’ in R Fuggle & A Rabie (eds) Environmental 
Concerns in South Africa (1992) at 27-52 and A Jaffe, R Newell, R Stavins ‘A tale of two Market Failures: 
Technology and Environmental Policy’ Ecological Economics 54 (2005) 164 at 165-166 and 171-174. 
34
 N Bruce and G Ellis ‘Environmental Taxes and Policies for Developing Countries’ (1993) World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. WPS1177. 
35
 For discussion of the evidence backing up contentions of this kind see M J Berger et al ‘Providing 
Economic Incentives in Environmental Regulation’ (1991) Yale Journal on Regulation 463.  
36
 Hahn and Stavins “Incentive based regulation” (supra note 28). 
37
 D James ‘Environmental incentives: Australian experience with economic instruments for environmental 
management’ (2007) Economics research paper No. 5, Commissioned by Environment Australia, 
Ecosystems Pty Ltd. 
38
 Kidd “Criminal sanctions” (supra note 24).  
39
 Reference here is to the preceding observation about inflexibility and administrative demands. 
40
 It needs to be noted that in theory private land owners have a legislated Duty of Care to take 
responsibility for any environmental degradation they will be causing or have caused in the past under 
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But if one takes the government’s limited capacity to implement and enforce regulation 
out of the equation, the environmental costs to a resource user responsible for 
amelioration may not be a significant proportion of his/her total cost of production. In 
such situations market influence on the resource user’s behaviour in response to price 
signals could be weak. A measure of intervention may then still be needed. The problem 
is the difficulty of identifying these circumstances in advance of deciding on the right 
policy mixture.   
 
A flexible self-regulated42 or co-regulated 43 system, allowing private agents to adapt so 
as to achieve environmental goals, may save costs and may result in environmental 
threats being responded to more efficiently than the ways prescribed by a command and 
control system.44 However command approaches may be indispensable as well as 
efficient in setting the overriding environmental goals in the first place. If correct this 
supports an argument for a blend between direct regulation and incentive provisions.  
 
Regulation traditionally focuses on supply-side controls to the neglect of demand-side 
management. This is a pertinent consideration in South Africa given the increasing 
impacts of development, i.e. demand forces, on non-renewable resources like species of 
flora and fauna on the brink of extinction.  
 
It needs noting that the nature of the relationship between the state and the regulated 
community is also pertinent. Members of the community being regulated are often 
productive agents in society who make valuable contributions to the economy. In 
circumstances where the environment is adversely affected by private individuals, such 
negative infringement is not necessarily through wilful disregard for the law but rather 
from ignorance and negligence.45 Control regulation, specifically the outright use of 
penalties and criminal sanctions should, as matters of efficiency and equity, be a last 
resort and not pose a deterrent to willing private co-operation.46  
                                                                                                                                                 
Section 28 of NEMA. In practice however, the utility this provision has in small scale private sector 
activities without the creation of dedicated incentives for landowners to abide by this provision is likely to 
be limited.  
41
 Kidd “Criminal sanctions” (op cit note 38) notes that, although the role of government tends to be 
reduced by incentive-based approaches to being a monitor, ultimate responsibility cannot be removed 
completely.  
42
 Self-regulatory instruments are not state-centered, but rather are initiated by industry. 
43
 These are different from self-regulatory instruments in that the objectives and standards are prescribed by 
the state and not industry. The determination of the mechanisms to achieve these objectives and standards, 
however, is left to the discretion of industry. For a discussion of the distinction between the two systems 
(self-regulatory and co-regulatory) see J Hanks ‘Achieving Industrial Sustainable Development in South 
Africa: What Role for ‘Self-Regulatory’ and ‘Co-Regulatory Instruments’ (1998) 5 South African Journal 
of Environmental Law and Policy at 310-312 
44
 Because of the capacity and resource constraints suffered by government, private sector initiatives may 
be more efficient in achieving environmental goals prescribed by government than in situations where the 
technical and legal conditions needed to be specified too.    
45
 Kidd “Criminal sanctions” (supra note 24) at 21. 
46
 Kidd “Criminal sanctions” (supra note 24) at 31 points out that a response to blanket threats of strict 
regulation may result in a ‘culture of resistance’ developing amongst companies that would have 
voluntarily complied in the first place.   
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Although the hurdles to effective implementation of such mechanisms are likely to be 
different in our institutional environment to those in countries like the USA and 
Australia, South Africa could nevertheless benefit from considering the approaches 
employed by states facing the same prospective impacts on biodiversity.47 Other 
countries including Australia,48 Canada, the US, 49 Kenya 50 and Costa Rica 51 are 
experimenting with variations on standard regulatory measures. These include 
instruments that enable and encourage individuals, companies, environmental 
organisations and communities themselves to participate in the conservation process.52  
 
It is therefore not surprising that a number of international and regional environmental 
instruments to which South Africa is a signatory, as well as domestic policy frameworks, 
advocate the adoption of a more incentive based approach to regulation.53 Aspects of 
these policy frameworks will be elaborated on further on in this dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47
 The facts may be different but the determining variables are the same. 
48
 James “Australian incentives” (supra note 37) at 90. 
49
  I Bowles et al ‘Economic incentives and legal tools for private sector conservation’ (1997) Duke 
Environmental Law and Policy Journal, 212. 
50
 N Gitahi ‘Easements and wildlife conservation in Kenya’ (2004) Unpublished paper presented at the 
second Colloquium of the World Conservation Union Academy of Environmental Law, held in Nairobi 
from 4-8, October. 
51
 D C Stockford ‘Property tax assessment of conservation easements’ (1990) 17 Boston College 
Environmental Affairs Law Review 824, Morrisette. 
52
 For instance, Kenya , the USA, Costa Rica and Australia have enacted legislation that provides 
specifically for the innovation of conservation servitudes. 
53
 Examples of international instruments include article 11 of the Convention on Biological Diversity; 
numerous places in the  Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl 
Habitats including Resolution VIII.23, par 3 and 4; article 13 (1) of the Stockholm Convention on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants and article 2 (1) (a) (v) of the Kyoto Protocol. A regional policy document 
endorsing the adoption of incentives is the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation Report of the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (2002) 41 ILM 1480, see paragraphs 16; 19 (b); 26 (b); 40 (k). 
Domestic policy documents endorsing the approach include Deloitte & Touche Consortium of Consultant 
Environmental Resource Economics Discussion Document Three – The Proposed Method for the 
Introduction of Economic Instruments as Tools of Environmental Management in South Africa (1996) 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, at 1, that identifies incentives as‘…potentially 
powerful weapons in the defence of the environment’ and that environmental management is all about 
offering the private sector a combination of ‘incentives, rewards and punishments’, White Paper on 
Environmental Management Policy for South Africa (GN 749 in Government Gazette 18894 dated 15 May 
1998). The White Paper sets the context for all future environmental regulation in South Africa and it 
notably acknowledges the valuable role of incentives at 7, 32, 53, 74, 81 and 86 as well as People-Planet-
Prosperity: A Strategic Framework for Sustainable Development in South Africa: Draft Discussion 
Document (GN 1486 in Government Gazette 29293 dated 20 October 2006) at 94, 97, 121, 131, 168 and 
171. 
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2.2 Reliance on protected areas 
 
When privately owned land is declared protected, this entails a range of restrictions 
placed on it to regulate its use, including human access of any kind in the long term. 
These stipulations aim to sustain the conservation value of the land in question including 
its biodiversity status, but policy intentions can also be wider and vary in accordance with 
the legal classification applied to that land. A constraint is brought into being in that 
restrictions often impact on the physical amount and value of economic benefits that the 
piece of land can provide under its new status. Therefore the net effect will influence the 
willingness of private landowners to participate in the biodiversity conservation process. 
In practice this cannot always be anticipated.54  
 
If protected areas are to be increased, say from five to ten percent of the total area under 
all forms of ownership,55 then protected area designation (usually) needs to be extended 
into the private sector. Given the dominant objective to be profit-seeking from land 
exploitation, the instruments used to achieve this increase in protected land needs to be 
effective as well as efficient.  That is, cost must be minimised and gain maximised in 
each case.  
 
This research on policy alternatives is conducted with a presupposition in mind, namely, 
that a key task in environmental management has always been to balance conflicting 
considerations. Along with every approach to environmental protection there are 
accompanying drawbacks. The optimal choice has to be a selection of means that 
achieves the desired objectives while attending in the process to the multitude of 
outcomes that may not mutually cohere. Given the shortcomings of the protected area  
regime mentioned below, the exclusive use of the mechanisms it provides for biodiversity 
conservation is wholly unlikely to make it the optimal choice.  
 
Historically, the formal legal protection of specified areas in South Africa was 
complicated by a range of administrative variables wide in scope. These considerations 
entail overlaps between jurisdictions while at the same time imposing constraints on the 
capacity to act and the budgets of the responsible bodies. 
 
The fragmented application of national legislation and the inconsistent classification of 
areas with recognised conservation value have also proved problematic. These 
deficiencies are reflected in the diversity of legal terms used to describe different 
categories within the range of protected areas in South Africa.56 Although the number of 
                                                 
54
 So positive economic incentives for landscape protection are essential mechanisms for success in private 
land declaration, yet effective devices are not easily designed in concrete situations. 
55See A Paterson ‘Property Tax: A Friend or Foe to Landscape Protection in South Africa’ (2005) 12 South 
African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 97 for a discussion about the objectives of ministerial 
statements to this end. Given the private ownership statistic already mentioned, coupled with the 
acknowledged biodiversity threat in South Africa, (Wynberg “decade of biodiversity conservation” (supra 
note 7) to achieve adequate levels of biodiversity conservation through the exclusive use of protected area 
mechanisms is likely to entail increasing the number of protected areas by more than this proportion. 
56
 J Glazewski and A Paterson  in Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa (2005) LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Durban (Chapter 11) at 189. 
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applicable categories has been decreased by recent legislation57, a comprehensive and 
uniform definition of protected areas for regulatory enforcement is still elusive. But that 
said, the following IUCN formulation has been adopted as an encompassing definition in 
the South African literature58: that is, 
 
An area of land and/or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of 
biological diversity and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed 
through legal or other effective means.59 
 
The process followed in the legal translation of any land into the status of a protected 
entity is affected by whether such land is initially state or privately owned. As will be 
argued below, the capacity of conservation mechanisms to attain their objectives is 
influenced by this division of ownership. But for manageable scope, the discussion of 
policy alternatives in this thesis is confined to the conservation potential of privately 
owned land. This section discusses briefly the legislative framework within which 
protected areas can be potentially expanded. The problems restricting the framework’s 
operation and which thus undermine reliance on protected area declarations in South 
Africa are then examined. 
 
2.2.1 Legislative framework     
 
Paterson has done groundwork research on economic incentives that can be aimed at 
inducing land owners to seek formal legal protection of their land. 60  Yet there remains 
leeway for investigating the design and implementation of regulatory tools for land-
managing bodies as well as for funding organisations. These initiatives have to ensure 
that biodiversity conservation measures remain effective in perpetuity and not merely 
during their initial operation. This is a tall order. That said, incentives for private sector 
conservation have proved to be useful in other national jurisdictions. Thus they may be 
effective also in the South African context when applied efficiently, bearing in mind the 
range of influences on their implementation that currently are without guiding precedents.  
  
The Environmental Right in Section 24 of the Constitution imposes a duty on the state61 
that has resulted in the evolution of a swathe of framework legislation as well as 
environmental laws at the sectoral level. The interpretation of these laws and the practical 
nature of the environmental rights for individuals when these are instituted have received 
a measure of judicial attention in the post-constitutional era.62  
                                                 
57
 National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Amendment Act (31 of 2004).  
58
 Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa (2005) (supra note 56). 
59
 ‘Guidelines for Protected Area Management Categories’ (1994) IUCN.  
60
 Paterson “Property tax” (supra note 55). 
61
 The state’s obligation is to ‘…take reasonable legislative and other measures that: (i) prevent pollution 
and ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources.’  The Constitution (108 of 1996).  
62
 For instance, see  
1. Minister of Health and Welfare v Woodcarb Ltd & Another 1996 (3) SA 155 (N),  
2. The Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region, and another versus Save the Vaal Environment & 
Others 1999 (2) SA 709 SCA and  
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One dimension in the implementation of these laws will be to seek a deliberate balance of 
command and control with incentive-based approaches when legislation can encompass a 
blend of the two. In potential, environmental laws can provide a range of devices for 
conservation which include the legal scope for the declaration of private land as 
possessing protected area status. The possibility of incentive measures evolving so that 
private agents can accomplish the same purpose is also implicit in the legislation. The 
following section discusses these incentive levers briefly, and separates them into those 
that determine the suitability of private land for inclusion into protected areas and those 
that facilitate such inclusion if and when judged suitable.  
 
2.2.1.1 Legal tools affecting inclusion    
 
Framework legislation  
 
NEMA63 and on a lesser scale ECA64 are environmental laws intended to construct a 
regulating framework. NEMA contains a range of principles to be considered in the 
interpretation of all sectoral environmental laws and further, in theory, to co-ordinate the 
functions of environmental authorities in giving effect to the principles of co-operative 
governance in the constitution. In practice at present, co-operative governance is not yet 
recognisable in the mandate aimed at co-ordination of these authorities. Yet landscape 
protection is an integral feature, perhaps even the most prominent of the components of 
biodiversity conservation. 65 So the NEMA principles are highly pertinent in devising the 
legal tools to be used in private landscape conservation. 
 
NEMA also has a Section 28 Duty of Care (the DOC) and a Section 30 Emergency 
Incident Protocol that apply in any sphere of economic activity prone to significant 
environmental impact. In theory the DOC has thus a dual purpose in private sector 
protected area declaration. For instance, a private land owner whose DOC is triggered 
may have no affordable alternative but to comply with the provision and thereby avoid 
causing a negative effect on the environment. This may entail the owner initiating the 
declaratory processing of his or her land in order to avoid its possible degradation. In this 
manner the DOC can act as a pre-emptive tool.  
 
Thus the broad applicability of the DOC and the potential liability it imposes 
prospectively for those upon whom the obligation lies may by itself stimulate anticipation 
and avoiding action in individual owners. By appropriate design this likelihood should 
increase in direct proportion to the ecological sensitivity of the landscape privately 
owned. In this manner, the DOC acts as a disincentive, i.e. prompting action to avoid 
negative liability for environmental degradation. The DOC is useful too in enforcement 
                                                                                                                                                 
3. BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs 2004 
(5) SA 124 (W). 
63
 The National Environmental Management Act (107 of 1998). 
64
 The Environmental Conservation Act (73 of 1989). 
65
 Paterson “Property tax” (supra note 55) notes that ‘…landscape constitutes an integral part of the 
environment…’ This is why organs of state need to consider the NEMA principles when exercising 
functions which may impact on South African landscapes.  
 18 
as it is administratively easy to use,66 and it gives authorities the opportunity to react and 
recover costs where these apply.    
 
Planning legislation  
 
Planning legislation influences landscape conservation at national, regional and local 
levels. For instance, there are national EIA regulations but administered by provincial 
departments. This provides leeway for regional manipulations of the thresholds stipulated 
in the regulations, depending on perceived provincial environmental needs. In addition, 
integrated development plans67, structure plans and zoning schemes for example, are 
produced by local authorities. All these powers affect the declaration of protected areas 
(and general landscape protection), but due to the rationing of budgetary resources the 
interventions that result are not necessarily effective in the expansion of protected areas 
within the public sector.68         
 
2.2.1.2 Legal tools for inclusion 
 
Protected areas legislation  
 
The Protected Areas Act prescribes a process for the declaration of private land as 
habitats meriting protection. It provides (1) for initiation of the process by a Minister, 
MEC or private land owner; (2) for public participation; (3) for differentiated tiers of 
category registration; and (4) for declaration procedures applicable to state and private 
land.  
 
 It also provides a management framework that contains different treatment regimes for 
different types of protected areas.69 If implemented correctly it could be an important tool 
for ensuring the maintenance of protected areas in perpetuity once their initial 
declarations are completed.  
 
The written agreement in the registration phase of the declaration process serves also to 
maintain the protected area’s legal status under successive owners. If a written contract70 
is concluded between the private landowner and the government then such an agreement 
could be registered against the private property title-deed, making it binding on future 
owners.  
                                                 
66
 Kidd “Criminal sanctions” (supra note 24) as well as M Kidd ‘Some Thoughts on Statutory Directives 
Addressing Environmental Damage in South Africa’ (2005) South African Journal of Environmental Law 
and Policy vol 2 60. Kidd states further that the competent authorities responsible for the issue of directives 
have demonstrated that they are not sure how to use the provision. The DOC’s simplicity then is not 
sufficient in itself to offset the capacity constraints on state administration. 
67
 In practice these are often not worth the paper they are typed on. 
68
 Government needs to purchase private land in order to declare it protected but, as observed already a 
number of times, limits on capital expenditure make this difficult. 
69
 This framework comprises a management authority, management plan, internal rules, performance 
indicators, annual reports, and it can mandate the termination of protected areas. 
70
 Whether a written agreement between the private land-owner and the state is required or not depends on 
what level of ecological importance the land is accorded, and consequently what type of protected area it is 
liable to be designated as. 
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Natural resource legislation  
 
In the existing body of natural resource legislation, the NWA and the Biodiversity Act do 
not provide legal tools expressly for protected area formation. In practice however, 
provision for the formulation of bio-regions under the Biodiversity Act alongside water 
catchment areas under the NWA echoes the procedures for declaration and management 
in the Protected Areas Act.  
 
The Biodiversity Act states that bio-region designation may occur in any region which 
‘…contains whole or several nested ecosystems and is characterized by its landforms, 
vegetation cover, human culture or history…’71 Hence this category description places 
the land in question within the ambit of the definition of protected areas quoted in the 
introduction to this sub-section above.72  
 
2.2.1.3 Incentives for inclusion 
 
Protected areas need to be conserved in their natural or pristine state in order to serve 
their ecological purpose. If owner income is generated primarily from the exploitation of 
land through, for example, agriculture, plantations or mining, then expropriation of even 
limited property rights in the private sector might not leave residual rights that are 
economically sustainable.73  
 
So in order to encourage more private landowners to initiate the declaration of their land 
as protected areas there needs to be both economic incentives in place sufficiently 
attractive for them to do so, along with an influential conservation culture in wider 
society. Recent decades have seen the emergence of numerous industrial country 
examples of such influences on policy action. As mentioned above, despite state 
resources to acquire land for designation as protected being chronically limited at the 
present time in South Africa, it is believed by policy makers and administrators that the 
alternative of direct regulation can prove to be even more expensive. This is projected 
presumably by costs per unit area. But such judgements about the long run merits of 
alternative policy directions are found in the international literature.74    
 
The stipulated hierarchy of protected areas also needs to influence the design of suitable 
incentives. For instance, the economic inducements available to landowners choosing to 
                                                 
71
 Section 40(1) 
72
 The tools contained in these two pieces of legislation are prima facie similar in effect to those in the 
Protected Areas Act. But there are of course pertinent differences that need to be disentangled if their 
implementation is to be efficient. 
73
 The likelihood of this outcome will be governed by the prevailing strength of environmental values, by 
recognized rights and by social priorities. These comprise a complex mix of influences on policy. The 
process is certainly not static and therefore to predict the outcome a priori is difficult.  
74
 J Aronson et al Restoring natural capital: science, business, and practice (2007), Island Press, 
Washington DC at 88. 
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declare their land should hinge on the importance of the type of protected area under 
which the land in question is to be categorised.75   
 
Property tax 
 
Property tax incentives to landowners choosing to declare their land as protected areas 
have been proposed by Paterson.76 It is not necessary to describe the details of this 
approach here, but its scope is pertinent to the research questions under discussion.  
The Property Rates Act contains mechanisms for subjecting privately-owned properties 
to differential rates of tax in accordance with their use and location.77 In the case of 
environmental indicators of land quality, Paterson suggests a tiered approach in which tax 
benefits are given to landowners appropriate to the protected area status that their 
designated land merits. Private owners of ecologically sensitive land subject to extensive 
land-use constraints would be accorded the highest property tax benefits in lowered rates.  
 
Some forms of farming may be more compatible with protected area designation 
relatively speaking.  For instance, game farming that caters for the commercial and 
recreational hunting industry can be more conducive to sustaining and even restoring the 
biodiversity of natural veld than is the bulk of other activities falling within the definition 
of ‘agricultural purposes’.78 But it should be noted that the botanical and ecological 
research on different cultivating and grazing practices is not yet complete.79 
 
The discussion below concerning the application of fiscal measures to environmental 
protection problems is useful for understanding the role of tax differentiation in South 
Africa. The issue was introduced above but only in the context of protected areas.  
 
2.2.2  Political situation 
 
In recent decades there has been a shift away from viewing natural resources in general 
and protected areas in particular merely as valuable assets worthy of protection. The new 
perspective is that economically sustainable conservation and environmentally 
sustainable development are complementary objectives.80 If this presumption is correct, 
                                                 
75
 This is dictated by decisions concerning the ecological sensitivity and the environmental significance of 
the land. Therefore such judgments determine whether the land is to be a Special Nature Reserve, National 
Park, Nature Reserve or Protected Environment. Whether a written agreement is to be entered into between 
the landowner and the minister or MEC depends also on the type of protected area to be designated. 
76
 Paterson “Property tax” (supra note 55). 
77
 Section 8 of the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act (6 of 2004). 
78
 Another example is the land designated as protected in accordance with the objectives of the Biodiversity 
Corridor Project. I have interviewed a number of private landowners who signed contracts submitting their 
land for use in this project and thereby voluntarily limited their land-use practices. A number of them 
mentioned that a key factor in their co-operation was that certain proportions78 of their farms, by spatial 
extent, are marginal or unusable for the land-use practices they are currently engaging in. 
79
 For example see N Tainton Veld Management in South Africa (1999), University of Natal Press, 
Pietermaritzburg as well as W R J Dean and S J Milton The Karoo: ecological patterns and processes 
(1999), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
80
 See White Paper on Biodiversity (supra, chapter 3 (D), although this general concept is reiterated in 
numerous other domestic policy documents, for instance in environmental legislation (see the Preamble to 
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then a facilitating framework of laws and policies needs to be put in place. The change 
from a global paradigm protectionist in its intent to one that makes public participation 
itself a component of sustainable exploitation is a further characteristic of this new 
recognition. 81   
 
The South African expression of this approach is evident in the trend for natural 
resources to be placed in the public trust,82 with the objectives laid down for their use 
decided in partnership with the people considered to be legitimate stakeholders. Yet this 
practice with its political rationale is taken one step further to give protected areas an 
added dimension of protection in the South African context. Sustainable resource 
management, and specifically community based conservation83, are judged by policy-
makers as provisions either capable of balancing prospective development with 
conservation or as incapable of doing so.84  
 
The new legal instruments85 appear also to have stimulated rural development, but in 
certain cases resulting in encroachment on ecologically sensitive landscapes.86 If the 
indicated legislative and policy tools are not put in place and implemented effectively, the 
balance desired on social grounds may not be achieved sustainably. 87 With ongoing 
pressure for development from population growth South Africa’s status as the third most 
biologically diverse country in the world might then be short-lived. 
 
2.2.3 Resource limitations 
 
The government faces constraints in facilitating the declaration process under the 
protected areas framework. This pertains to its administrative capacity as well as to its 
finances. Thus the role that protected area extensions can play when aimed at increasing 
private conservation endeavours is limited. There is a clear need for alternative 
mechanisms to those available under protected areas legislation. In intention such devices 
encourage the participation of private land owners by facilitating their skill input and 
financial contribution to conservation. To be effective this should take place in a manner 
                                                                                                                                                 
NEMA)  and international environmental instruments with regard to biodiversity, for example, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity 31 International Legal Materials 818.  
81
 One remaining scenario is where a measure of elitism can dictate use and access to protected areas. 
These would then be viewed by the policy agencies as having purely recreational value. But in practice 
under provisions motivated by this conception, the individuals who could benefit most from the resource 
are often excluded from access to it by the high price charged for access.  
82
 For example, see section 3 of the NWA, section 3 of the MPRDA, section 3 of the Protected Areas Act 
and section 3 of the Biodiversity Act.  
83
 Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa (2005) (supra note 56) at 326. 
84
 In addition, these methods have the potential to address certain socio-political problems that result from 
pre-constitutional apartheid policies. Or at least they provide operational scope for doing this. Thus if micro 
level tweaking is feasible, protected area legislation may be capable of balancing development as well as 
transformation objectives on the one hand with conservation on the other. If put into practice this will entail 
trading-off land redistribution initiatives against biodiversity gains and landscape conservation. This would 
be fraught with political as well as economic difficulties.  
85
 In the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Amendment Act (31 of 2004). 
86
 Paterson “Property tax” (supra note 55) at 97. 
87
 I am not implying that these tools are not yet available and used in South Africa, but I am suggesting a 
hypothetical outcome in which long-term sustainability becomes difficult to achieve. 
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that makes up for inconsistencies in the results of the policy levers available under the 
protected areas legislation. 
 
Proclaimed Protected Areas in South Africa are seldom financially self-sufficient and 
most require significant subsidies and donations in order to be operational, that is, to meet 
their conservation objectives.  In general a protected area declaration in its current 
formulation is a financially limited instrument. As such it is unlikely by itself to achieve 
higher socially desirable levels of sustainability in land use practices under private 
ownership.  
 
In a policy perspective it is pertinent therefore to recognise in the international literature 
the potential scope for economic instruments in managing the environment. In other 
countries this realisation is coupled to the understanding in national governments that 
economic levers may achieve environmental objectives in more cost-effective ways than 
traditional command-and-control regulatory mechanisms.88 The potential for methods 
brought into being by specific legislation89 to supplement the working of protected areas 
tools in private conservation provides the impetus for this study in environmental law. 
Thus the aim is to discuss the devices available under individual pieces of legislation, and 
to consider whether these can fill gaps left by protected areas provisions through 
encouragement of environmentally sustainable practices by private landowners.  
 
2.2.4 Planning inconsistencies 
 
The Protected Areas Act states that management plans produced by the responsible 
authorities have to be aligned with other planning initiatives such as integrated 
development plans (IDPs) and biodiversity management plans. Integrated planning is 
intended to take into account interventions aimed at by legislation other than this act. But 
expanded protected areas declaration does not provide a sufficiently overarching 
framework.90 This is a serious concern when one considers the diversity of influences that 
govern the implementation and conduct of a protected areas regime, and which therefore 
should feed into decision procedures. Thus one must look to other legislation for the 
planning tools necessary to make the protected area network, as designated under 
successive declarations, effective and representative.91  
 
The planning framework brought into being by various legal acts may in itself contribute 
to make the protected areas programme workable. The acts discussed below also provide 
channels for setting up organisations and institutions to cater for sector-specific 
conservation, as well as for an array of private-public agreements and partnership 
possibilities. The written undertakings between landowners and government authorities 
under the Protected Areas Act are intended to balance landowner and conservation 
                                                 
88
 James “Australian incentives” (supra note 37) at 13. 
89
 The reference here is to legal mechanisms available outside of Protected Areas legislation. 
90
 A Paterson ‘Wandering about South Africa’s Protected Areas Regime’ (2007) SA Public Law 22(1) 1-33 
at 3. 
91
 The protected area framework is representative if it reflects the quantity and variety of protected areas 
suitable on a national level. 
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imperatives. One problem is that these undertakings can be extremely vague and in need 
of enhancement in the form of guidelines.92  
 
2.2.5 Geographical fragmentation 
 
Designated protected areas are judged not to be managed or administered in a holistic 
manner in South Africa.93 This is the case with the functioning of Protected Areas when 
assessed within broader management contexts. Protected status affects how cohesively 
the land functions as a unit within regional networks or corridors.94 Where fragmentation 
exists it limits the utility of protected areas as conservation tools when these are declared 
in the private sector, for instance, where endangered species exist in small separated 
groups on private land. Clear instances are the scattered habitats of the Riverine Rabbit in 
the north-western Karoo and of certain lily species in the Cape Fynbos Biome. Therefore 
it is acknowledged that other tools outside of the legal framework provided by protected 
areas legislation95 are needed to rectify the skewed incidence and uneven functioning of 
protected areas in South Africa. These may yield higher levels of integration in the 
conservation system.  
 
2.2.6  Exclusion 
 
In the past national governments approached conservation in ways that did not encourage 
local communities to participate equally in the implementation process.96 This is a 
pertinent concern in protected areas as communities are often excluded by the policy 
implementation from using or managing land that has been ear-marked for conservation 
purposes. The displacement of communities from land they consider part of their natural 
heritage – that occurred for political reasons in the past - is a historical legacy in South 
Africa that complicates the search for new approaches.97  
 
 
 
                                                 
92
 Paterson “Protected areas regime” (supra note 90) at 4. 
93
 The sheer number of laws, types of protected area and administering departments at all levels vouch for 
this fact. For a comprehensive listing of laws and administering departments see Paterson “Protected areas 
regime” (supra note 90) at 7. For a list of the types of protected areas see Glazewski and Paterson ‘Land 
Reform and Agricultural Resources’ in Glazewski Environmental law in South Africa (supra note 56) at 
325. 
94
 The problem arises because protected area distributions across a region are often fragmented in ways 
unrelated to the ecological nature of the area being protected. So they occur as islands. But as already 
stated, contiguity between protected areas is necessary for the policy to function holistically. Uneven 
cooperation between private land-owners in the designation process is a key factor weakening policy.   
95
 National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act 57 of 2003 as amended by the National 
Environmental Management: Protected Areas Amendment Act (31 of 2004). 
96
 A Kiss (ed) ‘Living with wildlife resource: wildlife resource management with local participation in 
Africa’ (2006), World Bank Technical Paper No. 130 – Africa Technical Department Series 5.  
97
 Local sensitivities about conservation are therefore particularly pertinent to the design of policy 
innovations. The inclusion of communities in designating and managing protected areas is crucial on social 
as well as political grounds if they are to benefit disproportionately more in the longer term from the 
declaration of protected areas to which they have a claim.   
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2.2.7 Perpetual status 
 
Under the old protected areas regime there was a wide range of official bodies charged 
with the authority to regulate the conditions under which formal protected areas were to 
be preserved. Also no assurance was forthcoming that the formal status of a protected 
area was consistently registered against the title deed of a designated property. Thus the 
status of the land’s environmental protection in perpetuity was left uncertain. 
 
2.2.8 Economic incentives  
 
The use of legal mechanisms might best be coupled to a national property tax system that 
can provide private owners with an incentive that stimulates use of conservation 
devices.98 For instance, tax expenditures in general (as tax concessions are known in the 
public finance literature) could encourage the implementation of conservation tools such 
as the protected area declaration process in South Africa. This is one potential use of tax 
instruments whose purpose is to encourage landowners to initiate the process themselves 
rather than wait for the state to do so.99 
 
The role that incentives can play in reconciling the objectives of economic development  
and environmental protection can be observed in the growing consumer demand for 
environmentally friendly or green products.  
 
 
2.2.9 Concluding remark 
 
To complicate policy formation, putting in place protected areas can conflict as an 
objective with the fundamental human value constituted by biodiversity, namely, the 
preservation of species diversity into the future. But different levels – in the sense of 
species numbers and hierarchy - are inherent in the concept of biological diversity. It is 
quite possible that if one level is conserved only piecemeal, the remaining levels may be 
negatively affected by ongoing economic exploitation. So to allow for differentiated 
effects, protected area designations, for instance, aim to protect ecosystem, species and 
genetic diversity by controlling the manner in which all anthropogenic activities impact 
upon them.  
 
If protected areas are formed to shield an identified species100, then the wider ecosystem 
within which the species is embedded as well as the diversity at the narrower genetic 
                                                 
98
 An idea outlined by Paterson “Property tax” (supra note 55). 
99
 This would mean in most instances the purchase of private land by government in South Africa but, as 
already argued, for the foreseeable future the state is unlikely to have significant financial capacity to do so.  
100
 This consideration is not confined to protected areas. For instance, section 43 of the Biodiversity Act 
states that biodiversity management plans can be produced for ‘an indigenous species – (i) listed in terms of 
section 56; or (ii) which is not listed in terms of section 56 but which does warrant special conservation 
attention’. 
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scale may not be given due consideration.101 This would mean that diversity at the two 
indirectly affected levels may ultimately be reduced.  
 
For instance, genetic drift and gene flow are key forces in evolution. They contribute to 
population variation across space which also enables natural selection to take place 
through time. Protected areas by design restrict such genetic drift and gene flow, which 
indirectly has an impact on variation - a dimension of species diversity - and 
consequently on the pace of evolution. With diversity as the raw-material upon which 
natural selection operates, the evolution of genes, species and ecosystems in a protected 
area can take place only within a framework restricted by human intervention. In such 
areas this constraining grid is an imposed one, and although viable and effective 
conservation processes are occurring, some manipulation of the environment is taking 
place on the broadest level simultaneously.  
 
So the aim of instituting environmental control in the long run can inadvertently serve to 
restrict the natural development of diversity.102 To place this possibility in perspective we 
need reminding that conservation is a human construct.  In general then imposing 
conservation measures on the environment, in order to conserve natural habitat 
characteristics judged important, will also modify it to a degree. It follows that as an 
exclusive option to increase biodiversity conservation, the declaration of protected areas 
may not be an optimal choice. Yet given that the environment is already divided into 
private landscape segments greatly in need of protection, enhancing conservation would 
be a meaningless endeavour without having at hand a number of protected areas to 
conserve biodiversity.  
   
 
2.3 To sum up 
 
2.3.1 Need to create mechanisms to conserve inside and outside protected areas 
  
In view of their limitations the sole use of protected area mechanisms has been argued to 
be an inadequate tool to achieve sufficient levels of biodiversity conservation in South 
Africa. Their problems range from: (1) administrative variables like socio-political 
considerations that can block environmentally compelling declarations; (2) resource 
constraints on the state; (3) issues of long-term security; (4) broader theoretical issues 
like geographical fragmentation; and (5), no incentive-based designation provisions in 
place. The incidence of biodiversity is also not constrained by property or jurisdictional 
                                                 
101
 The focus on conserving flagship species, those that attract tourism and monetary donations, and on 
keystone species, those that anchor an ecosystem, supports the observation that human intervention is likely 
to be an influential factor on all levels of decision. 
102
 An example is the allocation of licenses for the breeding as well as culling of natural populations. 
Although the licensing system means that the industry is potentially controllable, the selection that takes 
place on a genetic level is undoubtedly being driven by human choice which itself is dictated by prevailing 
marketplace demands such as trophy and meat prices. Anthropogenic forces on selection are likely to 
operate on the genetic as well as species levels, and ultimately modify the ecosystems within which the 
controlled indigenous species shape their own habitats. If there is human preference for a specific type then 
that type will be selected, thereby limiting genetic diversity and the rate of species evolution.  
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boundaries.103 Mechanisms used to raise biodiversity levels therefore need to be 
applicable in different contexts of responsibility, and thus to function as components 
within broader biodiversity management regimes.  
 
2.3.2 Need to create incentives 
 
The comparison of command-and-control with incentive creation does not argue for the 
exclusive application of one approach over the other. The limitations inherent in direct 
regulatory approaches range from the constraints placed on private innovation, adaptation 
and efficiency, to the imposition of excessive administrative costs and regulatory 
responsibility on the state. The latter is a pertinent concern in South Africa as 
elsewhere.104 The preference for a proactive rather than reactive approach reinforces the 
argument for the inclusion of incentive devices.105 It will be expanded on below that the 
blend of providing scope for individual choice along with direct regulation is arguably 
the most suitable approach in South Africa.  
 
 
3.   MECHANISMS TO CONSERVE BIODIVERSITY OUTSIDE 
        PROTECTED AREAS 
 
Considering first, the fragile status of biodiversity in South Africa and second, the range 
of activities potentially detrimental to its preservation, the list of remedial mechanisms 
available is extensive. Extension of protected areas is clearly one useful tool. But for 
reasons already mentioned it is judged by researchers and some policy makers to be 
insufficient on its own to achieve adequate levels of conservation in South Africa. This 
dissertation focuses on policy levers or mechanisms deemed most important as well as 
most feasible for local deployment.  
 
Devices of ancillary relevance are not analysed to the same level of detail so are 
mentioned only fleetingly. Instruments that (1) co-opt support for the establishment of 
conservation organisations; (2) comprise co-management agreements; as well as (3) 
foster sustainable land-use practices in the private sphere, comprise the distinctions most 
useful here.  
 
All mechanisms need to be implemented through suitable incentive avenues. But for 
clarity, within the range that policies comprise, what are judged different approaches are 
discussed separately. The analysis of incentive devices is left to section four.  
 
 
                                                 
103
 This illuminates the governance requirements alluded to in the Ostrom “Institutional analysis” (supra 
note 1) quotation at the head of this paper. In other words, variety in the selection of available mechanisms 
is essential. 
104
 The fact that command and control approaches fail to remedy market failure, due to the production and 
consumption of environmental goods and services without market values, is also particularly pertinent here.  
105
 The fact that incentive approaches may be better suited to deal with externalities will be discussed once 
the types of incentive devices have been categorized in section 4.   
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3.1 Conservation organisations 
 
Membership of conservation organisations is a potentially valuable mechanism to 
promote biodiversity conservation outside of protected areas. Organisations brought into 
being for environmental defence or restoration provides an opportunity for private 
individuals to illustrate leadership by meeting various indicators of environmental 
performance.106 They are useful institutions for undertaking research, rehabilitating 
degraded areas, educating, eliciting contextual information and enforcing internal rules, 
all of which may contribute to conserving biodiversity. Additionally, once best practice 
has been established, the fact that organisations exist may itself be a dimension of 
environmental concern that stimulates participation in the market for particular ‘green’ 
products associated with members as producers.107  
 
As will be seen below, the formation of conservation organisations often results in a set 
of internal rules for the members of the organisations to abide by. As these rules become 
implemented, if they serve to further the objectives of the legislated act that provided for 
the organisation to be formed, the regulatory burden on the state for the area within which 
the organisation functions will decrease. Coupled with this decrease in necessary state 
coercion will be a lessening of administrative costs and through recognition an emphasis 
on the value of environmental resources in state hands. 
 
Key legislation providing for the establishment of different forms of conservation 
organisations is CARA, the NVFFA, the NWA, the Non-Profit Organisations Act and the 
Income Tax Act. Legislative provisions that provide for the (array of forms of) 
conservation organisations will be discussed in the following section. 
 
 3.1.1 Conservation committees108  
 
By general agreement agriculture poses the biggest threat to biodiversity in South Africa, 
although the evidence backing this judgement will not be presented here.109 It follows 
that any policy mechanisms and institutions that serve to increase sustainability in 
agricultural practices, as long as they do not generate perverse incentives, can be useful 
tools for conserving biodiversity in the private sector. Conservation committees are 
                                                 
106
 But clearly this depends on the incurred costs in foregone income. 
107
 This would take place through information channels like labelling that identify producers with 
organisations and environmental causes. This is discussed in following sections. The existence of 
organisations may contribute also towards higher cost-effectiveness for individual members as producers in 
certain sectors. When the flow of information is increased through the establishment of organisations, 
whether between individual members or between the state and the organisation, these collective exchanges 
can induce higher levels of efficiency in achieving environmental goals. It can further determine best 
practice that is specific to different habitats, regions or economic sectors. 
108
 Conservation committees are established under the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act 43 of 
1983 and includes Soil Conservation Committees established under the Soil Conservation Act (76 of 1969). 
Section 15 (3)(f) of CARA states that such committees shall be deemed to have been established under its 
section 15 (1).  
109
 White Paper on the Conservation and Use of South Africa’s Biodiversity (‘White Paper on 
Biodiversity’) (in GN 1095 GG 18163 of 28 July 1997) at 12. 
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obligated to conserve agricultural resources in particular.110 Given that the amount in 
place and the fertility of soil is integrally linked to biodiversity then conservation is a 
plausible objective of these committees.   
 
CARA provides for the establishment of conservation committees111 for specific areas 
determined by the responsible Minister. These committees are obliged to112 conserve the 
natural agricultural resources in the designated area113 in a manner that furthers the 
objectives of CARA. Objectives laid out that are of particular importance to private 
biodiversity conservation include(1) maintaining the production potential of land; (2) 
conserving  natural agricultural resources (such as water one presumes); (3) preventing 
the destruction of water resources; (4) preventing erosion; (5) protecting vegetation and 
(6) combating weeds and invader plant infestation.114 
 
Conservation committees are also obligated to advise the Department of Agriculture115 on 
matters regarding the implementation of the Soil Conservation Act and on any related 
scheme in the area in which they are formed.116 In this manner they ease the regulatory 
burden placed on the relevant authority operating locally.117 
  
Realising the objectives of CARA is a complex affair as it entails the balancing of 
agricultural development with conservation in such a way that both objectives are 
encouraged. In this sense the two hats that the Department of Agriculture wears will be 
reflected in the duties of conservation committees.  
 
3.1.2 Regional conservation committees  
 
Regional conservation committees under CARA118 are established in similar ways to the 
area committees mentioned in 3.1.1 but they play more of an advisory than implementing 
role. They advise conservation committees as well as responsible state departments about 
the need and extent of the act’s required application, or about the obligations incurred 
under the act by a particular Scheme119 in the region in which the committee is charged 
with supervising the furtherance of CARA objectives.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
110
 Section 15 (2) (a). 
111
 Section 15. 
112
 This is also a section 15(2)(a) obligation. 
113
 This is the particular privately owned area for which the conservation committee was established.  
114
 These are laid out in section 3. 
115
 The department that administers the act, which is currently the Department of Agriculture. 
116
 Section 15 (2) (b). 
117
 Accordingly they save such bodies administrative costs as well. 
118
 Section 16. 
119
 Established under section 8. 
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3.1.3 Fire Protection Associations120  
 
Although fynbos is a fire-adapted system of vegetation,121 it is difficult to use fire in 
anthropogenically modified landscapes for constructive purposes. Just one or two fires at 
the wrong times of year or at the incorrect frequency over a period can cause additional 
stress for many indigenous localised species.122 Fire protection associations (FPAs) can 
reduce the likelihood of fires occurring in a region and therefore can have a positive 
impact on fynbos biodiversity.   
 
Accordingly the NVFFA provides for the establishment123 of FPAs.124 Landowners in an 
area specified as vulnerable125 may co-operate with one another to form and register 
FPAs for the collective furtherance of the conservation objectives listed in the NVFFA.126  
 
These FPAs are obliged to develop and apply veld-fire management strategies for the 
areas they are assigned to manage with the aim of reducing veld-fire risk in its area of 
responsibility. They have an obligation to co-operate with neighbouring FPAs.127 Fire 
associations must further design rules concerning fire prevention and management which 
consequently become binding on all their members. In the wording of the act there is also 
reference to the fostering of community-based veld-fire management structures in the 
areas that the FPAs administer.128   
 
Any existing association can register as an FPA, if it is formed under other environmental 
legislation or provincial ordinances that have the prevention and combating of veld-fire 
as one of its leading objectives129, a functioning FPA being an example. For instance, 
Biodiversity Management associations or Water User associations could register under 
these provisions.   
 
                                                 
120
 Fire protection associations are established under the National Veld and Forest Fire Act 101 of 1998 (the 
NVFFA). 
121
 Tainton Veld Management in South Africa (supra note 79). 
122
 Cape Nature Fact Sheet: Landowners Guide to Fire Management (2007), a document prepared for the 
Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund.  
123
 In fact Cape Nature is currently launching initiatives that urge landowners to develop FPAs. For more 
information see the Cape Nature Fact Sheet (supra note 127). 
124
 Section 3. 
125
 Section 3(2)(a-d) refers to areas of co-operation within which it would be suitable for FPAs to be 
formed, that is, where veld-fires are regular, or where there is a relatively uniform risk thereof, or there are 
uniform climatic conditions, or relatively uniform types of vegetation.  Section 3 (3) and (4) provide further 
that if an FPA is not formed in such an area the Minister may provide discretionary advice as well as  co-
operation with landowners in order to facilitate the forming of such FPAs. Cape Nature is currently 
adopting this role.   
126
 Section 3 (1), namely, ‘…for the purpose of predicting, preventing, managing and extinguishing 
veldfires…’ 
127
 Section 5 (1) (a). 
128
 Section 5 (1) (h) supra. 
129
 Section 4 (3)(a-g). 
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Financial and other assistance to Fire Protection Associations as well as to individuals 
who prepare firebreaks and incur unreasonable expenses in doing so is provided for under 
the NVFFA.130 
 
The main incentive for land-owners to join FPAs may well be to meet regulations 
applicable to them.131 To a profit-seeking owner it can appear cheaper to avoid having 
one’s activities considered an offence under section 25 and consequently being subject to 
a penalty under section 24 if one is a member of an FPA.132 Thus joining an FPA may be 
a means of lessening the likelihood of incurring liability for a fire if it were to break out 
on one’s land. But the truth of this conjecture turns on the balancing of probabilities, 
which are the incurring of liability if one is not a member (and not paying fees) against 
the likelihood of doing so if one is a member of an FPA (while paying fees). These 
relative probabilities are not easily weighed up by the average land-owner, while the 
relevance of the decision depends on the alternative monetary costs.133 
 
The formation of FPAs also promotes cost saving by ensuring that services are not 
duplicated by individual land-owners. Resources can be combined between members to 
manage fires more effectively than it is likely any individual landowner could. FPAs have 
the capacity to divide the provision of services efficiently between individual members so 
that all partners can save on the costs of measures implemented in their personal 
capacities. 
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 Section 7 (a) and (b). 
131
 It is important to note here though that there is no presumption of negligence in civil proceedings 
concerning fire damage. 
132
 A related advantage is that section 6 delegates enforcement powers to Fire Protection Officers with 
regard to provisions of the act as well as to the rules of individual FPAs. 
133
 For instance, section 25(4)(a) states that an individual is guilty of a second category offence if they fail 
‘…to meet the standards of readiness for fire fighting referred to in section 17(1)’. Section 17(1)(b) states 
that land owners on whose land a veld-fire begins are obliged to ensure that, in their absence, ‘…[other] 
persons are present on or near his or her land who, in the event of fire, will (i) extinguish the fire or assist in 
doing so; and (ii) take all reasonable steps to alert the owners of adjoining land and the relevant fire 
protection association…’. Surely the assurance that other individuals who own property surrounding one’s 
own will assist in extinguishing a fire originating on one’s property is more likely if one is a member of a 
co-operative institution specifically designed for such a purpose? This seems to be the thinking that 
underlies the drafting of this section.  
 
Section 25(4)(b) states further that an individual is guilty of a second category offence if he or she fails to 
‘…notify the persons referred to in section 18(1)’. Section 18 (1) states that a land owner ‘who has reason 
to believe that a fire on his or her land or the land of an adjoining owner may endanger…the environment, 
must…(a) take all reasonable steps to notify (i) …the executive committee of the fire protection 
association…and (ii) the owners of adjoining land…’ to avoid committing an offence. The duties of FPAs 
are outlined in section 5, so that 5(1)(b) states that FPAs must provide in their fire protection strategies 
‘…agreed mechanisms for the co-ordination of actions with adjoining fire protection associations’. If a 
land-owner has the backing of a regional FPA he or she is likely to be in a better position to fulfil 
obligations under section 18(1)133 than if they were non members. Functioning in this manner FPAs are a 
means through which communication between members can be improved for mutual benefit. 
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Membership of an FPA also entitles members to advice and assistance from state 
authorities. 134 Information regarding precautions and technology as well as scientific 
likelihood of a fire may be obtainable from state agencies. Access to such information is 
streamlined by FPA membership as FPAs operate in partnership with the government for 
a common objective.135 
 
3.1.4 Water User Associations  
 
Water is unquestionably a non-living resource that underpins the sustainability of all life 
in a region. Its availability is therefore a prerequisite to maintaining a certain level of 
biodiversity. The sustainability of any natural resource like plant and animal species is 
clearly affected by the nature and extent of water user activities.136 The environmental 
record, international and local, contains a vast number of supporting examples, China 
being currently the location of many high profile instances like the Three Gorges Dam on 
the Yangtze River.137 Therefore creating water-user associations (WUAs) with sound 
conservation objectives can have a positive impact on biodiversity.  
 
Chapter 8 of the NWA provides for the establishment of WUAs. The establishment of 
such associations is a mechanism to foster co-operative public support between water 
users for ensuring localised sustainable water use in a specific region. Membership of a 
WAU is regarded by the NWA as ‘buying-in’ to the process of making water use (as 
managed by the relevant CMAs138) a sustainable activity for the mutual benefit of all 
members.  
 
It should be clear to private land owners that water is not a natural resource with 
availability confined by property boundaries. Therefore it should not be difficult to 
convey the idea to water users that the sustainable management of water resources is 
achieved more effectively on the catchment scale than on individual properties. Such a 
presumption is spelled out clearly by the NWA within the framework of a national water 
resource strategy.139 To secure sustainable access to water entails that co-operation 
between holders of legitimate rights of exploitation should be understood by private land-
owners - regardless of other legislated obligations administered by catchment 
management agencies - as being in their individual self-interests.  
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 Section 3 (4) provides for the Minister to ‘…give assistance to and co-operate with owners in forming a 
fire protection association.’ 
135
 Section 10 imposes an obligation on the state to communicate fire danger ratings to FPA members on a 
regular basis. Section 11 provides further for the designation of FPAs as institutions responsible for 
disseminating information regarding fire danger. The FPA can claim payment for providing this service. 
136
 This factor is recognised in section 2 (g) of the NWA where the text states that water resources are to be 
conserved, managed and developed in ways which take into account ‘protecting aquatic and associated 
ecosystems and their biological diversity.’ 
137
 J Yardley ‘A troubled river mirrors China’s path to modernity’ (November, 2006) The New York Times 
1-12. 
138
 ‘Catchment Management Agencies’. 
139
 Section 5. 
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WUAs afford certain advantages to members and government that are similar to FPAs. 
The creation of WUAs that become effective institutions for self-regulation140 are clearly 
in the state’s interest to encourage. WUAs could save the state substantial outlays and 
also reduce the pressure on the administrative ability of catchment management agencies. 
The pooling of resources is also in the cost-saving interests of individual members and 
WUAs. It facilitates the distribution of useful information regarding conservation and 
sustainable use of water resources. WUAs get further assistance in achieving their 
objectives from the model constitution of water user associations contained in Schedule 5 
of the NWA.  
 
Because sustaining water access in perpetuity is an objective common to all WUAs, if 
private land-owners can value, however crudely, these long term gains it141 should serve 
as a positive motive to join WUAs. But additional incentives are bound to be needed too, 
most likely from the market. This is why fostering co-operation for the formation of 
WUAs might best be pursued in conjunction with market-based incentives put in place 
for the purpose. These incentives are discussed further in section 4.1.2 below.  
 
 
3.1.5 Public benefit organisations 
 
The Income Tax Act provides for the establishment of ‘public benefit organisations’ 
(PBOs). One intention of these provisions is to assist private individuals to form 
conservation organisations. Although they are valuable in that they provide safeguards 
against conservation organisations being used as tax avoidance vehicles,142 the stringency 
with which the Act regulates PBOs for tax avoidance also limits their utility143 for 
biodiversity conservation purposes.  
 
These stringent requirements include (1) the organisation must be an association that is 
not for gain144 under the Companies Act; 145 (2) the objective of the PBO must be to 
further a public benefit activity; (3) the activities the organisation is involved in must be 
non-profit, so economic interests cannot be promoted at all;146 and (4) the PBO cannot 
engage in any business which generates a share of income exceeding 15 percent of the 
gross income of the entire organisation.147 
 
As stated already, although application of these requirements prevents individuals from 
forming PBOs as tax avoidance vehicles,148 unfortunately it also constrains the capacity 
of PBOs to be formed for conservation purposes. For instance, the fact that PBOs cannot 
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 Or ‘co-regulation’, depending on the particular agreement with government that each WUA establishes. 
141
 That is, security of sustained water access. 
142A Paterson ‘Tax incentives- valuable tools for biodiversity conservation in South Africa’ (2005) (1) 
South African Law Journal 182 at 207. 
143
 Section 30. 
144
 Section 30 (3) (g). 
145
 Act 61 of 1973. 
146
 Section 30 (1) (b) (i), (ii) and (iii). 
147
 Section 30 (3) (b) (iv) (aa). 
148
 The point Paterson ‘Biodiversity incentives’ (supra note 142 ) makes is echoed here.  
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undertake activities that generate income for the sole purpose of funding their public 
benefit activities may mean that conservation organisations formed under these 
provisions may not be financially sustainable. In this way the formation of conservation 
organisations under these provisions may be discouraged because they can turn out not to 
be financially viable. So the fact that these provisions149 exclude certain conservation 
organisations from recognition as PBOs means that these conservation organisations are 
not entitled to certain tax benefits.150  
 
3.1.6 Obstacles to the use of organisations for biodiversity conservation  
 
A legitimate concern in policy formation is that in the absence of direct regulation there 
is weaker assurance that environmental objectives will be achieved through organisation-
based mechanisms should these be relied upon wholly.151  For example, if district 
organisations are voluntary, then there is no guarantee that the most important 
environmental decision-takers in the locality will participate.  
 
Additionally, in the absence of regulation to govern participant behaviour then certain 
members may co-operate more than others.152 This places an unfair burden on members 
that participate voluntarily, a problem well documented in the literature on collective 
action.153  
 
The solution here is to foster public buy-in so as to overcome the free-riding behaviour by 
inactive members of any and every voluntary organisation. But how this is most 
efficiently done remains a difficulty in policy design. 
 
There is often scepticism in the private sector, particularly amongst farmers, about certain 
projections of environmental risk. In contrast, these are held to be valid by policy-makers 
in government.154 This sceptical outlook endures regardless of the unanticipated costs 
likely to infringe on land users’ current as well as future levels of resource access. A 
common example is the over-grazing of vegetation by successive generations of land 
users despite visible signs of deterioration. This observation about contrasting attitudes 
towards risk remains to be fully researched. But the issue in part may hinge on the 
responsible authorities articulating the benefits of risk aversion in a language and format 
that enables all stake-holders to achieve a minimal understanding.  
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 Of particular relevance is section 30(1) (c) (iii). 
150
 This point will be discussed further in the in the section 4.1.2 on positive incentives that are based on 
existing markets.  
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 This is a common concern with approaches that modify economic behaviour with instruments working 
through markets and are purely voluntary. 
152
 Certain members could free-ride on the high environmental performance of more dedicated fellow 
members. 
153
 Ostrom “Institutional analysis” (supra note 1). 
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 N Tainton Veld Management in South Africa (supra note 79). 
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3.2 Co-management agreements. 
 
The main relevance of co-management agreements to promote private conservation in 
South Africa is that goals can be set that exceed current regulatory standards for 
maintaining biodiversity. As opposed to self-regulatory instruments objectives and 
standards are prescribed by the state and not industry. Mechanisms as avenues utilised to 
achieve these goals are however generally determined by the regulated entities. For 
instance cost effective means or methods can be negotiated between private entity and 
state, towards mutually beneficial ways to achieve these goals.  
 
Agreements between private enterprises and government155 offer a number of advantages. 
First, they can facilitate the flow of information between authorities and enterprises that 
awards benefits to both parties. Second, private resource users are often legally obligated 
to provide performance indicator information through regular reporting. This can be 
onerous and costly. But if negotiations are conducted between the state and the regulated 
community regarding the acceptable measurement of performance, then partnerships 
between the parties may lessen both the information obligation on the private enterprise 
through reporting while minimising the monitoring duties the state would have in many 
cases. Thus agreements may help the state in enforcement and help private enterprises go 
beyond what they are capable of doing when acting alone. In the language of game theory 
this is a positive non-zero-sum outcome.  
 
Negotiated agreements also provide the opportunity for a blend of command and control 
with incentive-based management practices. This is particularly pertinent to 
environmental policy formation, as this dissertation has argued throughout. In the pursuit 
of higher levels of conservation, regulation could be expanded to prescribe overall policy 
goals like base-line targets and timelines to be adhered to that are more demanding on 
individuals and groups than those in the current standards laid down by law.156 But the 
details, such as the best means of achieving the newly set objectives, could be open to 
negotiation and therefore be, in potential, more cost-effective due to the greater volume 
of information made available in the negotiation process. This is hypothetical but 
supported by working precedents in industrial country jurisdictions.157  
 
Yet, because these agreements are by design co-regulatory, to be successful certain 
legislative pre-requisites must be set first. For instance, sites of high-conservation value 
require priority recognition and organisations suitable for entering agreements158 need to 
be identified by state agencies. To make such decisions, the criteria for participation must 
be established. Thus the minimum terms, standards and reporting requirements for 
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 These advantages are not necessarily confined to environmental matters. 
156
 The fact that the objectives of agreements go beyond base-line compliance standards is important 
because this provides a strengthened incentive for the modification of private behaviour towards this end. 
157
 D Bromley The handbook of environmental economics (1995) Blackwell, Oxford. 
158
 In other words, organisations that are judged suitable to engage in co-regulatory agreements with the 
government. 
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private decision-takers entering into agreements have to be set in advance for monitoring 
the ongoing compliance.159      
 
Partnership agreements may be promising mechanisms too for establishing internal 
codes-of-conduct for membership of sustainable user associations. But it is important to 
recall here that organisations with voluntary rather than imposed membership and 
without strict criteria for participation allow ongoing imbalances in the distribution of 
responsibility for conservation action.160 No universal design feature for an organisation 
can be built into it to neutralise this problem, but rather piece-meal adaptations must be 
devised and applied in a continuing process.   
 
In the establishment of co-operative approaches to private biodiversity conservation, and 
the necessity of dovetailing conservation with development, positive incentives are 
arguably more useful than negative ones. Not only are carrots cheaper than sticks but 
innovation is a more likely outcome of the process. Given that the partnership itself 
provides the impetus for arrangements of this kind there is a lessened need for top-down 
coercion.  
 
The incentives brought into being include the opportunity for private partners of 
government to influence the public policy process. If a particular company has an adverse 
history in government records, or is in an industry more competitive than the average, as 
well as being in a tightly regulated field, then the partnerships under discussion may 
provide an opportunity for such companies to improve their reputation with all 
stakeholders.  
 
Provision for conservation agreements as such exists in a number of other jurisdictions, 
including the United Kingdom, Australia, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands 
and the United States.161 South African legislation currently provides for more than one 
type of negotiated environmental agreement, discussed below.  
 
3.2.1 Biodiversity Management Agreements (BM agreements) 
 
Section 44 of the Biodiversity Act provides for the establishment of BM agreements 
between government and responsible organisations or individual persons for the 
implementation of biodiversity management plans.162 BM agreements concern either 
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 A Paterson ‘Tax Incentives – valuable tools for biodiversity conservation in South Africa’ (2005) (1) 
South African Law Journal at 189 discusses certain procedures to be followed before agreements can be 
effective. 
160
 As mentioned already, certain members can enjoy the incentive rewards from membership but 
contribute little to achieving the objectives behind the establishment of the agreement with government, or 
from the formation of the organisation in the first place. The ‘long-stop’ of penalties like criminal sanctions 
may be an important factor in preventing such behaviour and promoting participation, but a drawback is 
that this lengthens the regulatory dimension of any co-regulatory agreement.  
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 Bowles “Incentives for private conservation” (supra note 49) at 217-220. 
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 Section 44 provides for the establishment of a biodiversity management agreement in accordance with 
the provisions of section 43. Such agreements are designed to ensure ‘the long-term survival in nature of 
the species or ecosystem to which the plan relates … (a) and are to be published in the Gazette (43(3))’.  
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particular ecosystems or particular species. They are generally designed to sustain the 
long term survival of the subject of the agreement.163  
 
The reporting on progress regarding the implementation of the plan must be stipulated 
and agreed on by the relevant authority beforehand to ensure compliance. This also 
serves as a safeguard against any benefit accruing to the instigator of the agreement that 
is not provided for because it is the result of non-conservational activities. The Act 
provides further that such agreements cannot be in conflict with any plans or agreement 
already established under other environmental legislation.  
 
BM agreements themselves, or the set of criteria established in order to make them 
effective, can be useful for earmarking specific activities undertaken on private land 
judged suitable to qualify for incentive rewards. Once the criteria are identified for 
establishing the specific value of biodiversity that are required before an agreement can 
be established, suitable landowners can then be targeted. Also, incentives can be aligned 
with the content of particular agreements so that private activities, economic and 
environmental, can be guided accordingly.  
 
3.2.2 Co-operative environmental management agreements (CEMAs) 
 
Chapter 8 of NEMA164 provides for co-operative environmental management agreements. 
They can be initiated by the Minister or any MEC to engage in an agreement with any 
person or community that serves to promote compliance with the national environmental 
management principles.165 As certain principles refer specifically to biodiversity, CEMAs 
are particularly relevant private agent conservation mechanisms. They provide for the 
undertaking by an individual or community intended to uphold or improve on the 
conditions laid down by law concerning a particular activity.166 Therefore they may be 
important in establishing a range of activities that, if undertaken in the private sector, 
trigger certain incentives to act in environmentally supportive ways. Minimum standards 
are laid down for the content and procedures to be followed in concluding these 
agreements.167  
 
The substance of agreements subject to negotiation and ultimately drawn up in 
regulations are (1) public participation requirements;168 (2) the agreement’s duration;169 
(3) access to information;170 (4) the reporting procedure;171 and (5) monitoring.172 
Measurable targets are set and negotiated to be achieved on particular dates,173 which is a 
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 Set out in Chapter 1 of NEMA. 
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 Section 35 (3) (c) (i) 
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safeguard to ensure that non-conservation activities are not taking place as a result of the 
incentives (if any) being provided. The consequences of non-compliance also need be 
included in the agreement, including penalties that may be tailored to suit certain 
situations. 
 
Further, CEMAs should detail incentive goals or make use of existing ones that may be 
provided for individual persons and communities engaging in such agreements.174 
Depending on the activity that the agreement concerns the set of available incentive 
devices here is wide in scope. 175  
 
3.2.3 Mutual assistance agreements  
 
The National Veld and Forest Fire Act 101 of 1998 (the NVFFA) provides for joint 
agreements between the Minister and any landowner or FPA to provide mutual assistance 
in fighting fires.176 An agreement for mutual assistance between FPAs and between an 
FPA and the government is provided for on land that, in the judgements of their 
respective members, is in the common interest to conserve.177  
 
Individuals or FPAs that support the Minister in providing assistance for the protection of 
private and state land against fires may be entitled to compensation from the Minister if 
the agreement in question is established beforehand.178 Per contra if the degree of 
compensation for assistance is decided on before the particular agreements are 
established this could serve as an incentive for private landowners to get into such 
agreements with the state. For instance, financial incentives could be provided by the 
Minister to farmers in a given region to take mutual responsibility for fire hazards, 
whether the surrounding land is privately or state owned. This situation would save 
government resources in the way of providing personnel, equipment and training to 
protect state land. This would be so if the incentives given to farmers to join such a 
scheme are less than the resources to be expended by the state on its own in managing 
veld-fires on state land.  
 
The NVFFA makes no explicit mention of market-based incentives in the context of 
mutual assistance. However the protecting of natural landscapes by FPAs against fires is 
clearly a public benefit and therefore in potential may trigger certain provisions under the 
Income Tax Act.179 The latter allow for the provision of positive incentives like tax 
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 Section 35 (3) (d)  
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 Environmental Management Co-operation Agreements: A Guide for their Design and Use (June 2000) 
Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism. 
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 Section 19 (1).  
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 Section 19 (2).  
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 Further, Section 19 (3) points out that the payment of compensation for assistance rendered may be 
necessary in certain cases. This makes the provisions of 19 (1) interesting because in partnerships between 
the Minister and FPAs, or the Minister and individual landowners, it provides for direct subsidies as 
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 Section 10 (1) of the Income Tax Act (58 of 1962) allows for the granting of income tax exemptions for 
income receipts and capital accruals to public benefit organisations, although conservation organisations 
are not currently classified under this provision. These provisions will be discussed further below. 
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benefits instead of financial compensation as a consequence of a mutual assistance 
agreement.180 
 
 
3.3 Mechanisms aimed at achieving sustainable land-use 
practises/natural resource use. 
 
Given the percentage of private ownership of land at 88 % as mentioned in the 
introduction, the compelling need for mechanisms that enable private landowners to 
adopt sustainable land-use practises probably exceeds the opportunities that co-
management agreements and conservation organisation formation afford. Private land-
owners when motivated to do so often lack resources to conserve communally valued and 
owned environmental assets like components of biodiversity. New incentives are 
therefore essential in many cases. Thus policy mechanisms that can be used to identify 
which landowners should qualify for such incentive provisions are also integral to 
policies of innovation.  
The following mechanisms are informative, first, as capable in principle of fulfilling this 
conservation function under private ownership. Secondly, they illustrate the available 
range of useful devices for selection. Third, they show that a number of alternatives exist 
outside the formation of conservation organisations and co-management agreements. 
 
Yet it is not the purpose of this section to assess the viability and the net merits of all of 
the mechanisms of relevance to biodiversity conservation in an encompassing way. This 
is not possible in a single dissertation not aiming to deal comprehensively with these 
mechanisms. These mechanisms are certainly considered relevant but not the dominant 
theme of the research problem at hand. 
 
3.3.1 Schemes 
 
Clearly most land-owners lack the resources to undertake voluntary measures of 
conservation unless there are incentives designed to motivate them. However there are 
numerous avenues that land-owners can freely choose to engage in activities serving to 
conserve biodiversity depending on the monetary costs to be incurred. 
 
CARA provides for the voluntary contributions of individual land-owners to biodiversity 
conservation. This can take place through a variety of laid-down procedures. All however 
are formulated under CARA as schemes within which various objectives can be pursued 
on private land through the actions of the land-owners. These beneficial activities include 
the construction of soil conservation works,181 intentional reductions of animal numbers 
on private land,182 restoration of damaged natural land183 and the combating of weed 
                                                 
180
 In practice this would translate into compensation in the form of subsidy or tax benefit for the guarantee 
of assistance given to the state by FPAs in the case of a veld fires. 
181
 Section 8 (1) (a) (i). 
182
 Section 8 (1) (a) (iii) 
183
 Section 8 (1) (a) (iv). 
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infestations.184 Further, the adoption of various schemes may be initiated and encouraged 
through the provision of subsidies from the state 185 and other avenues for incentive 
creation.  
 
3.3.2 Biodiversity Management Plans  
 
A number of South African natural resource laws provide for the establishment of 
management plans.186 A first observation is that these plans could include provision for 
the control of factors judged to affect biodiversity. Second, as mentioned above these 
plans are useful for identifying particular conservation activities undertaken outside of 
protected areas that should respond to the deployment of incentive provisions.  
 
Biodiversity management plans (BMPs) are described here as one example of provisions 
that can be incorporated into management plans. Any person or organisation187 wishing 
to make a contribution in money or ameliorative action to biodiversity management can 
submit a BMP to the Minister for approval.188 The BMP must be designed to secure the 
survival in nature of a particular species or even an ecosystem in perpetuity.189 The BMP 
must also be consistent with the national biodiversity framework as well as any 
applicable bioregional plan.190  
 
The Minister is required to review all such plans on a five year basis to assess compliance 
and, if deemed necessary, the BMP is amended.191 This measure ensures that any benefit 
accruing to the person or organisation for initiating the plan is not being awarded to 
activities non-conservational in nature. The Minister identifies and assigns responsibility 
to the designated person or organisation to implement the plan.192 In addition a 
Biodiversity Management Agreement may also be stipulated for this purpose.193 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
184
 Section 8 (1) (a) (vi). 
185
 Section 8 (1) states that assistance for such activities can be granted out of ‘the moneys appropriated by 
Parliament’.  
186
 These include the Biodiversity Act, the MPRDA, the NWA, the NHRA (in terms of the management 
and exploitation of cultural resources, like national heritage sites that are used for commercial benefit) and 
the NVFFA (if the land-owner concerned is a member of an FPA). 
187
 Organs of state can also submit proposals for viable BMPs, but this is not directly relevant to private 
sector conservation. 
188
 The plan must relate to ecosystems listed in accordance with section 51 and if not listed then warranting 
special attention (43 (1) (a)), or species listed in terms of section 55 or if not listed then again warranting 
special attention (43 (1) (b)). 
189
 Listed in terms of section 51. Or, if the ecosystem is not listed but does warrant special conservation 
attention in terms of section 43(1) (a) or the species is listed in terms of section 55 or is not listed but which 
does warrant special conservation attention in terms of section 43 (1) (b). 
190
 Section 45. 
191
 Section 46. 
192
 Section 43 (2). 
193
 Section 44, see ‘BM agreements’ supra.  
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3.3.3 Conservation Servitudes   
 
Servitudes are generally referred to in connection with protected area regimes and will 
not be discussed extensively here. In this protected area context, land-owners whose 
properties have high biodiversity values are targeted by a particular government 
conservation department. Such an organisation will enter an agreement with a land-owner 
regarding future land-use. Although the land-owner retains ownership they undertake to 
adhere to certain conservation conditions laid out in the agreement.194 The agreement 
often takes the form of a deed of servitude which is registered against the title deed of the 
property.195 It is binding on successive owners and therefore potentially protects the 
biodiversity status of the piece of land indefinitely.  
 
In principle servitudes could be extended for conservation purposes in natural resource 
sectors other than land. For instance servitudes exist in water management because 
property ownership does not equate with rights to use water resources. Consequently 
water access may cross over property boundaries.196 Agreements may be devised 
whereby water sources on a property in particularly abundant amounts197 are earmarked 
for certain uses only, regardless of where the water ends up being used.198  
 
The NWA provides for servitudes to work towards achieving public benefits.199 Although 
this scenario is currently an abstract possibility, if biodiversity is perceived to be fully a 
public good then water servitudes may turn out to be useful tools to pursue conservation 
objectives in such a climate of ideas. Yet evaluations of servitude utility can be made 
only in practical contexts.    
 
3.3.4  Donations200 
 
Many organisations established for private conservation purposes experience severe 
funding crises from time to time. Part of the reason is that donations account for a 
significant proportion of the resources necessary to operate such organisations. 201 But 
donated funds can operate both as incentives to environmental action and as enabling 
mechanisms to deal with the problem of conservation as a whole. For instance, in 
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 These may entail, for example, protecting certain aspects of the biodiversity status of the property. 
195
 Paterson “Biodiversity incentives” (supra note 142) at 182. 
196
 Because water is legally in the public trust, rights to property do not automatically equate with rights to 
use water resources on that property. Therefore water may need to be lead from one property through to 
another for its legitimate use.  
197
 This presumes there is a likelihood that rights to water on the property on which it exists may be granted 
to surrounding properties, but only if the surrounding properties acquire the relevant licences.  
198
 For instance, sustainable land-use practice that serves concurrently to conserve biodiversity status on the 
property where the water works relating to the servitude exist.    
199
 Section 131 (i) of the NWA provides that the High Court can take into account ‘public interest served by 
the water work relating to the servitude’ when determining compensation payable for the granting of 
servitudes.  
200
 Note that donations could be analysed as incentives rather than mechanisms in the context of co-opting 
support for conservation organisations, the concern of the following section. The position taken here is that 
donations have a dual function, so they can operate both as mechanisms and incentives. 
201
 Paterson “Biodiversity incentives” (supra note 142) at 191.  
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donating money to an environmental cause an individual identifies or aligns with that 
specific environmental concern. Donations matched by information dissemination bring 
to the fore concerns that warrant private attention and ameliorative action.202 
Alternatively, donor funds can generate resources for directly creating positive 
environmental incentives by monetary rewards in different contexts.203  
 
Thus one common and prominent use of private funds is for specific environmental 
causes.204 Creating the incentive for individuals to donate money could be fostered by 
encouraging the association of individuals and groups with specific sites, species or 
ecological considerations like the survival of remnant plant species.205  
To co-opt public support at a micro level, badges, gadgets, newsletters, certificates and 
travel services can reinforce the identification of individuals with the environmental 
causes to which they donate their money. These are established institutions and 
procedures in industrial countries, for instance the emergence and growth of the Sierra 
Club in the United States, founded in 1892 with a current membership of 1.3 million.  
 
A related but larger scale mechanism is that of identifying organisations such as natural 
resource user associations who supply products to the marketplace that promote a specific 
environmental cause through labelling.206  
 
The Income Tax Act207 provides for a number of tax incentives concerning donations 
made to certain conservation areas and organisations. For instance, donations made to 
organisations administering trans-frontier conservation areas are tax deductible,208 
although there is significant scope to raise the tax deductible limit on donations and 
widen this provision to apply to other conservation areas. The donations tax generally 
levied on donations of cash or property to organisations who qualify are also exempted in 
specified situations.209 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
202
 Therefore it is also a means to identify which types of private action warrant reward and where 
incentives to act are most suitably implemented. 
203
 For instance, donated money can be used to subsidise membership of farmers joining agricultural 
management schemes or sustainable user associations.  
204
 For example, a sponsorship scheme exists for the rehabilitation of the Chacma baboon population in the 
Western Cape.  
205
 Voluntary Friends groups in the Cape Peninsula, like the Friends of Newlands Forest or Friends of 
Rondebosch Common are illustrative cases.  
206
 A local example can be the case of bio-prospecting in the Northern Cape. Rooibos tea farmers can 
associate themselves with the preservation of indigenous knowledge and other associated community-based 
objectives through eco-labelling which identifies them with a particular organisation.  In return for 
membership they need to demonstrate that they are engaging in only sustainable agricultural practices. 
207
 Income Tax Act (58 of 1962). 
208
 The utility of tax incentives as outlined in the literature will be discussed in later sections.  
209
 Section 56 (1) (h) read with section 10 (1) (cN). These provisions are mentioned here fleetingly to 
illustrate that in terms of their feasibility, donations to conserve private sector conservation have a statutory 
context within which they need to be considered. 
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4.   INCENTIVES TO CONSERVE BIODIVERSITY OUTSIDE OF  
        PROTECTED AREAS 
 
4.1. Economic incentives    
 
Economic instruments to reward or punish behaviour are recognised on an international 
level as effective in the management of natural resources with significant environmental 
dimensions such as forestry, fisheries, land conservation, water quality and river flows.210 
Private land in general and agricultural land in particular supply a large volume and wide 
range of ecosystem services:211 such as mitigating or preventing soil erosion; 
sequestering carbon;  and, of particular importance to this paper, harbouring biodiversity. 
Yet owners seldom receive an explicit reward for making such contributions to 
conservation. One reason now widely acknowledged is that environmental goods and 
services are not exchanged in the marketplace because they are not easily divided up and 
the information about their valuation is not readily converted into price form. 212  
 
This failure of virtually all markets to value these goods and services with acceptable 
accuracy is a major concern for efficient allocation.213 It means that there is no way of 
tracking whether these goods and services are being suitably managed in both the public 
and private sectors.214 In this context the biodiversity problem emerges as an externality 
or external effect outside the price system used by decision-takers. 215  Few obvious 
incentives exist for farmers as private agents to conserve land in order to sustain the 
availability of such un-priced services in perpetuity. These have to be intentionally 
implemented by the state. 216 It follows that incentive devices are a means through which 
to reward the provision of ecosystems services that have no market valuation. 
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 R Stavins “environmental economics” (supra note 25) at 9-10 as well as L Milne, K Deketelaere, L 
Kreiser & H Ashiabor Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation (2003) at 27-51.  
211
 ‘Ecosystems services’ refers to environmental and natural resource services. According to N Sanchirico 
and J Siikamaki  ‘Natural Resource Economics and Policy in the 21st Century’ (2007) 165 Resources: 
Putting a Value on Nature’s Services at 8, as valued products these services encompass the full range of 
benefits that individuals and populations obtain from various ecosystems, including, for example, provision 
of food, water, timber, and fibre; regulation of climate, floods, and water quality; and provision of 
recreational and aesthetic amenities. 
212
 N Sanchirico and P Mumby ‘Economics, Habitats, and Biological Populations: finding the right value’ 
(2007) 165 Resources: Putting a Value on Nature’s Services at 11. 
213
 J Van Den Bergh (ed) A Handbook of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics (2002) Edward 
Elgar Publishers; and A Markandya, P Harou, L Giovanni Bellu, V Cistulli Environmental Economics for 
Sustainable Development: A Handbook for Practitioners (2002) Edward Elgar Publishers. 
214
 K Arrow et al ‘Economic growth, carrying capacity, and the environment’ (1995) 268 Science at 521. 
215
 For the purpose of the present discussion, the textbook definition of an externality is adequate. There are 
two components. It is an effect on others which is not properly accounted for by the decision maker and, 
secondly, as a consequence it does not appear in the price system as a cost or benefit. 
216
 However, some of the mechanisms and incentives discussed below deal with factors relevant to 
biodiversity degradation that have been assigned approximate market values by policy makers, like water 
(tradable water rights) and minerals (performance bonds). According to P G W Henderson ‘Fiscal 
Incentives for Environmental Protection- Introduction’ (1994) South African Journal of Environmental Law 
and Policy vol 1 at 49, fiscal incentives should be implemented in South Africa to cure market-failure 
brought about by social costs that cannot be internalized by the individual making decisions.   
 43 
Internationally, an increasingly widespread approach towards sustaining the provision of 
ecosystems services is to provide subsidies for land owners, users, resource managers and 
management organisations for services which they are held responsible to sustain. 
Projects where ecosystem services are paid for, based on their quantity or quality or both, 
217
 have been established in a number of countries around the globe and are operational at 
a variety of geographic scales.218 For instance, the World Bank has piloted watershed-
level initiatives in several countries.219 But a problem that will be elaborated below is that 
direct subsidies provided for such ecosystems services is not an exchange relationship 
that is necessarily sustainable into the future.220  
 
Payments directly to producers for ecosystems services, or the use of positive instruments 
to track them, presuppose prices that express relative values despite the absence of a 
market. Special valuation techniques and refined data are required, so it is a process that 
has yet to be applied widely in South Africa. Although economic incentives can be put in 
place via taxes and subsidies designed for the purpose,221 other fiscal avenues need to be 
explored as well. 222  
 
Monetary payments or equivalent economic incentives like tax expenditures, or foregone 
tax revenues, need to be proportioned accurately: (1) to the amount of services supplied; 
(2) to the degree of impact that for-profit land-use is having on ecosystems services; and 
(3) to the severity of restriction needing to be imposed on private land owners’ actions. 
These are severe identification and estimation problems not unique to South Africa. 
Devising a rational system of pricing environmental goods and bads remains a world-
wide challenge to the use of economic instruments for conservation. To be rational such 
relative prices have to reflect opportunity costs, that is, the cost of doing X with a unit of 
resources in terms of the cost of not doing Y with them. The latter are foregone benefits 
which are the true cost in human welfare of spending on X.     
 
4.1.1 Incentives that create markets  
 
Tradable use rights and discharge rights granted to individuals and organisations are 
possible means for curing market failure. The premise underpinning their use is that 
markets in general provide the most efficient means of allocating scarce resources. 
Incentives newly created are intended to take account of the unseen environmental costs 
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 These projects are often referred to in international discussion as ‘Payment-for-ecosystems-services 
programs’ or PES projects. 
218
 For instance, emerging markets for carbon sequestration credits constitute an evolving international 
development, whereas national forest conservation projects are operational in a sub-set of countries like 
Australia, Costa Rica and Mexico. See F Alpizar, A Blackman and A Pfaff ‘Payments for Ecosystems 
Services- Why Precision and Targeting Matter’  (2007) 165 Resources: Putting a Value on Nature’s 
Services, 22. 
219
 N Sanchirico and J Siikamaki ‘Natural resource economics and policy in the 21st Century’ (2007) 165 
Resources: Putting a Value on Nature’s Services at 19. 
220
 This is clearly the case unless some form of concrete environmental return is secured in perpetuity. 
221
 P G W Henderson ‘Fiscal Incentives for Environmental Protection- Conceptual Framework’ (1995) 
South African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy vol 1 at 55. 
222
 Paterson “Property tax” (supra note 55) explores the utility of property tax incentives under protected 
area designation. 
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or externalities associated with certain activities.223 To this end, governments prescribe 
thresholds for sustainable use of natural resources and the maximum rate of exploitation 
allowed for a unit of the resource in question.  
 
This is not an easy task because ‘carrying capacities in nature are not fixed, static or 
simple relations…they are contingent on technology, preferences and the structure of 
production and consumption [and] the ever changing state of interactions between the 
physical and biotic environment.’224 By design, allocations of exploitation rights are then 
made in accordance with these thresholds. It follows that trading schemes need to be 
fostered to harbour the exchange of these allocations.  
 
In South Africa, as elsewhere, licences are often stipulated to obtain access or use of 
natural resources. They are further required by individuals or companies to conduct 
activities that pollute, develop or impact on a natural landscape, as well as being 
transferable, and so provide for the possibility of trading. Yet no markets currently exist 
within which to trade such authorisations in South Africa, which means that substantial 
planning and cost involved in creating them lie ahead.   
 
Theoretically a tradable licence system would increase environmental efficiency in that 
resource users would be motivated by economic gain to lower their consumption and 
polluters to reduce their output. 225 Both consequences would provide benefits for 
sustaining biodiversity.  
 
Such a system by design is intended to maximise the economic efficiency of natural 
resource use in that a conferred right would end up being used in the most efficient 
manner. Various forms of tradable licenses are available here all of which have specific 
relevance to private sector biodiversity conservation, depending on the sector for which 
the licence is granted. Of these only fisheries rights in an allocation scheme are currently 
being implemented here. The restricted ambit of this paper precludes discussing the 
relevance of tradable permits to private biodiversity conservation in each sector in which 
they might occur. But the water resource sector is chosen for analysis of tradable water 
entitlements as an illustration of what is possible.  
 
However, for tradable licenses to be effective tools for biodiversity conservation, 
thresholds must be set for the sustainable use of resources.226 This was evidenced clearly 
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 T Tietenberg ‘Tradeable Permits in Principle and Practise’ (2003) Unpublished paper prepared for 
presentation at “Twenty Years of Market-Based Instruments for Environmental Protection: Has the 
Promise been Realised?” Donald Bren School of Environmental Science and Management (University of 
California), August 23-24.  
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 Arrow “Economic growth and carrying capacity” (supra note 214) at 521. 
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 The incentive is that authorizations obtained by individuals can be freely traded for profit if not used. 
For example, once the market for tradable rights has been created, the theory is that to stay competitive 
traders will strive continually to improve and innovate techniques of production that minimize the use of a 
particular resource. If successful they would potentially have more to trade on the market, or for the same 
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reflecting cost-efficiency is constantly expanding. 
226
 And conversely, the pollution levels stipulated in transferable authorisations need to be set within the 
schemes they are intended to be traded. 
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in the case of the South African fishing industry.227 Thus far thresholds set for rights 
allocation purposes have been shown to be highly complex in design as well as costly to 
implement given the range of environmental and socio-economic considerations to be 
taken into account in initial rights allocation.228 In addition initial implementation of 
tradable licence schemes has been extremely costly to implement in other jurisdictions.229 
In general, South African experience mimics that described for other developing 
countries in the international literature.  
 
A range of planning initiatives to determine trading thresholds in South Africa are 
currently in progress for a number of sectors.230 Yet the complex blend of objectives to be 
taken into account in natural resource rights allocation in South Africa may inhibit any 
blanket implementation across all or most of the sectors relevant to private interest 
biodiversity conservation.  
 
Environmental sectors in South Africa subject to provision for the trading of rights 
include biological resources231; conduct of fisheries232; forestry exploitation and 
regeneration233; mining234; and rights to water use.235 The scope of this dissertation 
precludes a comprehensive analysis of all provisions within these sectors. One exception 
is transferable water quotas discussed here as an illustration of the array of opportunities 
as well as the constraints that condition the use of incentive devices to create markets. 
 
4.1.1.1 Transferable water quotas and use-rights   
 
The NWA abolishes the private-public water divide, so that the power to allocate the 
authorisations of use and access to water is held by government. In legal perspective 
water resources are held in the public trust,236 a feature which makes this concentration of 
authority possible. Private water rights held prior to the NWA coming into force were 
therefore relinquished to the state. Beyond the five existing lawful uses of water under 
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 Section 14 of the MLRA provides for the annual establishment of total allowable catch (TAC) and total 
applied effort (TAE) in order to inform the rights allocation process.  
228
 See Foodcorp (Pty) v DDG, Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism: Branch Marine and 
Coastal Management 2006 (2) SA 191 (SCA) as well as Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister 
Environmental Affairs & Others 2004 (4) 490 (CC). 
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 James “Australian incentives” (supra note 37) at 65. 
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 These include, in the context of biological resources, the National Biodiversity Framework for South 
Africa (published for comment in GN 801 Government Gazette 30027 dated 29 June 2007); read together 
with the: National Biodiversity Spatial Assessment (M Driver et al National Spatial Biodiversity 
Assessment 2004: Priorities for biodiversity conservation in South Africa, Strelitzia 17, South African 
National Biodiversity Institute); National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan 
(www.environment.gov.za/). For understanding the context of transferable discharge permits see the 
National Waste Management Strategy (section 7).  
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 Section 97 (1) (f) (xiv) of the Biodiversity Act provides for the transferability of licences to use 
biological resources.  
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 Section 21 (1) of the MLRA provides for transferable commercial fishing rights. 
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 Section 24 (4 (a) is the relevant provision of the National Forest Act (84 of 1998). 
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 Section 11 (1) states that both prospecting and mining rights are transferable under the MPRDA.  
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 Section 51 of the NWA provides for transferring of water use rights. 
236
 The state is appointed as public trustee of water resources. 
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Sections 32 and 33, and the permissible water uses under Section 22237, land-users have 
to apply for permission to use a proportion of the water reserve in the managed catchment 
area within which they own land. Viewed in this way, the right to land or ‘land rights’ no 
longer equates with rights to access the water resources on that land.  
 
Thus, in both theory and practice water can be traded in the marketplace as a separate 
commodity to land.238 Examples of the determining variables that could affect water’s 
market-place value would be its quality constituents like salinity, security of supply in 
perpetuity, access location, and the scarcity as well as necessity of water to land use 
practices in a specific region or habitat. It follows that the value of certain pieces of land 
may decline significantly because of water rights being severed from property rights. But 
the legislated allowance for tradable water rights that could come into being might have 
the opposite effect of a rise in the price of the land in question. The net effect on the 
valuation cannot be predicted a priori, especially considering trading in this commodity 
is a new practice in South Africa.  
 
Certain units of land are particularly valuable because of the water supply on or beneath 
them. Thus the sale of permanent water use authorisations on such land to parties other 
than the land-owner would probably result in a decline in the separate value of the land. 
Individual land-owners may stand to lose capital value or face generally more adverse 
financial conditions, like borrowing costs, because of this innovation in rights separation.  
 
The framework of stipulation and facilitation which define a system of tradable water 
quotas that is potentially efficient is already in place on the national level under the 
National Water Resource Strategy and the National Water Resource Management 
Strategy. 239 But to date there is not yet any explicit reference to trading. Additionally, 
planning frameworks will be established for every significant catchment area240 and 
water resource241 in South Africa.  
 
Incentive levers are likely to be used to regulate environmental security with the potential 
sale of water authorisations. For instance, it could be stipulated that issued water 
authorisations may be bought and sold for use only in specific activities or types of 
agricultural practices242 and not for others. This will depend though on the progress of 
environmental research at the micro scale on diverse land uses. But in general, private 
initiatives for biodiversity conservation could readily fit into the design of such a system.   
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 This refers to the NWA. 
238
 Although not stated expressly, section 25 of the NWA provides for this possibility. 
239
 National Water Resource Management Strategy (GN 65 in GG 27199 dated 28 January 2005). 
240
 Section 8 of the NWA provides for the establishment of management strategies for catchment 
management areas. Section 9 (b) provides further that strategies must include ‘… objectives, plans, 
guidelines and procedures of the catchment management agency for the protection, use, development, 
conservation, management and control of water resource and control of water resources ….’ within each 
catchment area. 
241
 Presumably this would provide thresholds for the sustainable use of each significant water source when 
trading is taking place. Section 14 provides for the Minister to determine resource quality objectives. 
242
 The intention is that, at a minimum, only sustainable practices can be supported through the trading of 
water authorizations. 
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The conditions for trading access permits can be stipulated broadly on the water 
catchment scale, that is, by taking account of landscape features. These conditions are 
based on the classification of the water resources243 occurring within the catchment basin. 
Environmental considerations may be established on the micro-scale of individual 
sources within catchment areas, depending on the sophistication of management. For 
example, concerns like maintenance of river flow, control of salinity and preservation of 
wetlands may be established for each river through the water quality objectives the 
Minister lays down.244  
 
Certain proportions of the water reserve in a catchment area are granted to legitimate 
users. These individuals or companies can then trade with one another until the water 
quantity allocated by the authority is exhausted. The rate of return from production 
processes using the water as an input would determine which land-users end up in 
possession of the authorisation.245 In economic jargon, this highest rate of return is the 
‘highest marginal revenue product’,246 or the highest price generated for the last unit sold 
in the stream of water units traded between interested bidders.  
 
Hypothetically, this instrument could contribute to long-term self-regulation of the water 
reserve because both buyers and sellers are afforded opportunities to benefit from the 
creation of this market. Of key relevance to biodiversity conservation is the fact that an 
individual who has been granted a water-use authorisation, or who is engaging in one of 
the five lawful water uses,247 has a positive incentive to minimise the proportion of their 
allocated quota of water which they use. This is so because the next best use is sale of the 
water they are entitled to but do not use to the highest bidder in the market. The buyer 
stands to benefit because if their land-use activities require more water than they have 
been allocated out of the reserve, or they are able to use it more profitably per unit, there 
may be no way of accessing the additional water needed except on the market.   
 
4.1.1.2 Weaknesses of tradable water licences 
 
It needs noting that this general approach may clash with the equity imperatives of 
resource use in South African environmental management. Completely free trade in water 
authorisations, which in theory would be the most economically efficient approach, is 
unlikely to be politically acceptable if concentrated ownership or monopoly power in the 
market for water rights is condoned by legislation aiming at conservation.  
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 For each water resource that is considered significant in accordance with the classification system, 
resource quality objectives are determined by the Minister. This system lacks clarity. Although the 
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 James “Australian incentives” (supra note 37) at 54.  
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 Namely, Section 22(1)(a)(i) to (iii) and (b) and (c). 
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This is especially so considering that socio-economic and transformation concerns are 
explicitly mentioned concerning the obligations that govern the issue of authorisations 
under the NWA by the relevant authority. 248  The reference to redistribution of access 
extends to the actions of catchment management authorities in facilitating the issue and 
exchange of water rights within a market. 
 
It would be problematic if water authorisations were granted but remained unused, or 
were hoarded by the rights holder until a market demand for the entitlement emerged.249 
This possible outcome parallels the option of acquiring a retention permit under the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (the MPRDA). But it is not similar 
in its effects to the activation of multiple retention permits for mining all at the same time 
because of newly favourable market conditions.250 In contrast, if a number of retained 
water authorisations are triggered into use simultaneously, this could exert unforeseen251 
stress on the water reserve if thresholds for sustainable use had not been established 
beforehand. 
 
A key concern in relying on tradable water rights to achieve specific environmental 
objectives is the time they take to implement in practice. Markets for tradable use rights 
can take a long time to develop. This has been observed in the implementation of markets 
for such rights in other jurisdictions.252 In fact certain commentators believe that an 
efficient market is unlikely ever to develop given the relatively small size of South 
Africa’s industrial and commercial sectors.253  
 
A related concern is that once resources are invested in implementing the system, there is 
no assurance that the actual environmental objectives planned would be achieved through 
the targeted shifts in economic behaviour. Keeping in mind that tradable resource rights 
are operational in few other countries at present, it is a serious weakness that the models 
and performance data against which to estimate their utility in South Africa, are so few in 
number and so thin.254     
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need to redress the results of past racial and gender discrimination’ as well as ‘(b) the socio-economic 
impact of …the water use or uses if authorized and the (d) (i) socio-economic impact of …the failure to 
authorise the water use or uses (d) (ii)’. When interpreted in this manner, transformation as an objective 
needs to be balanced with development goals.  
249
 What James “Australian incentives” (supra note 37) at 59 refers to as ‘sleeper allocations’ in the context 
of tradable discharge permits. 
250
 Although bedrock (effectively mineral reserves) is the skeleton underpinning the biodiversity of all 
living species, the effect that stress on a water reserve would have on biodiversity is likely to be more 
severe in the immediate conceivable future than would stress on a mineral reserve.  
251
 ‘Unforeseen’ in that such a situation is most unlikely to have been anticipated at the time the 
authorizations were allocated.  
252
 Wilkie “Incentives Canada” (supra note 29). 
253
 R Stauth and P Baskind “Resource economics” in R F Fuggle & M A Rabie Environmental management 
in South Africa (1992), Juta & Co, Cape Town. 
254
 Although speculative, the political and economic context in which tradable authorizations are being 
implemented is also a relevant consideration. In South Africa, with limited capacity in government to get 
such a system off the ground, there may be administrative costs that are not outlined in the literature 
because they are not fully observable in the other jurisdictions already implementing them. This possibility 
is by its nature difficult to assess.  
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If the markets for tradable rights remain relatively inactive then the systems will not be 
effective cost saving instruments in the first place. A low volume market indicates that 
the average company is choosing not to buy and sell user rights. The prevailing market 
price may not then reflect accurately the alternative choice, that is, the full cost to 
companies of modifying production or extraction technology to meet regulation. The 
incentive for companies to be active and participate in a tradable market would then be 
weak and participation thin in what may be a low-level equilibrium trap. Devising policy 
interventions to overcome this deficiency would be a formidable challenge to the state 
agencies concerned.   
 
4.1.1.3 Extending market creating incentives 
 
The potential for creating trading schemes to regulate development255 as well as pollution 
has been provided by land-use256 and waste management regimes in South Africa.257 As 
remarked already, tradable pollution permits are yet to be comprehensively developed in 
South Africa. Their statutory feasibility is therefore difficult to evaluate here. Indeed only 
the new air pollution act258 allows explicitly for the prescription of trading schemes by 
way of regulation in South Africa. 259  
 
Tradable pollution permit systems rely on a regulatory base-line or a minimal command-
and-control framework of provisions. Government sets a general cap, for example on 
chemical emissions, and individuals and organisations can then be allocated permits 
allowing them to release a volume of pollutants equal to proportions of the overall cap 
that are determined in advance. Depending on which is considered the most cost-effective 
option, an organisation then has the choice of either altering their technology to meet the 
limits set by the permit, or of purchasing additional pollution credits from the market in 
accordance with how many units over the cap they are releasing.260 Credits can also be 
                                                 
255
 Tradable development rights work on the same principle as tradable resource user permits, but the 
former function also as area regimes or area specific methods of conservation. Development rights that can 
be traded are used to protect environmentally valuable areas like wetlands, or other landscapes high in 
biodiversity. Rights to develop specific areas of this kind are bought and sold in active markets for this 
purpose. A critical component of this instrument is that rights to develop can be traded only between parties 
inside the specific zonings or areas for which the development right has been granted. For instance, if a 
right to develop a residential area is held by one individual, he or she cannot sell this right to a buyer who 
wishes to use it for commercial development purposes or to a person who wants to develop housing on land 
zoned as agricultural.    
256
 Section 24 E (c) of NEMA provides for the transferability of environmental authorizations.  
257
 Waste management licenses will be transferable under section 57 (1) of the National Environmental 
Management: Waste Bill. 
258
 National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act (39 of 2004) 
259
 Section 53 (i) of the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act (39 of 2004) provides ‘that 
the Minister may make regulations that are not in conflict with this Act, regarding…trading schemes’. 
260
 Companies, or broadly any organisations responsible for polluting, can sell permits they own on the 
market to others unable to lower their pollution emission enough through technological modification that is 
cost-effective. 
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allocated to organisations that voluntarily lower their polluting rate below the prescribed 
limit.261  
 
Section 9 (c) of the Transfer Duty Act provides that transfer duty exemptions may be 
granted to organisations in respect of property they acquire, providing that the property 
will be used for the public benefit, or the organisations the property is transferred to are 
listed in section 10 (1) of the Income Tax Act.262 Although not yet feasible in that a 
framework for trading has not yet been established, it may be valid to extend to rights 
trading the reasoning employed in granting transfer duty exemptions. Currently these 
apply to public benefit organisations in respect of property under laid down conditions. 
The suggestion here is that they are extended to rights that are transferrable from one 
organisation to another where the latter use them for conservation purposes, once a 
facilitating trading framework is in place. For example, water use authorisations that are 
transferred to an organisation that plans on using them for enhancing biodiversity in a 
particular place, like a private nature reserve, may have some component of the cost of 
transfer deducted due to the conservation purpose the right to water ends up serving. 263  
 
4.1.2 Incentives that use existing markets 
 
This set of incentives, rather than creating new markets through the introduction of 
specific fiscal devices for this purpose, relies on the existence of already established 
markets and prevailing market forces. 
 
The following considerations are judged essential for distinguishing between policy 
levers for the purpose of (i) biodiversity conservation264; (ii) environmental impact 
effectiveness265; (iii) technical and administrative issues266; (iv) revenue generation267; (v) 
                                                 
261
 To illustrate, say Company A is releasing 250 measured units of pollution into a river system and the 
prescribed limit for which a permit is obtainable is 200 units of output. Company A invests in R&D to find 
new technology to lower their pollution output to 150 units, that is, 50 units below the prescribed limit. 
Company B per contra is unable to devise process innovations to lower its pollution output in a cost-
effective way. The extra 50 units by which Company A have reduced their output can then be sold on the 
market. Company B has an option to buy the 50 units of capacity as an owned credit. Yet Company B’s 
decision whether to buy will depend on how much the credits are selling for, the price being traded off 
against the potential cost Company B would incur if they had to invest in pollution-lowering techniques. 
Thus if Company B does pay for the extra 50 units of pollution it may emit, then it saves on costs otherwise 
to be incurred in technological modifications to comply with its permit conditions.   
262
 See section 4 below on positive incentives that use already established markets.  
263
 Section 56(3)(e) of the NWA ties in with this line of reasoning. It provides that ‘…on an equitable basis 
for some elements of the charges to be waived in respect of specific users for a specific period of time.’  
264
 This set of criteria is drawn from the prerequisites identified in the A Framework for Considering 
Market-based Instruments to Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa: A Discussion 
Document (2003) National Treasury (Tax Policy Chief Directorate) (hereafter referred to as the ‘National 
Treasury Paper’) at 55-62. 
265
 To be effective the link between biodiversity conservation as the objective and the instrument used as 
the means should be direct and clear.  
266
 The instrument should be simple and inexpensive to implement in terms of the administering authority’s 
responsibility, as well as imposing low compliance costs, and it should preclude perverse effects.  It has 
been mentioned more than once above that government at all levels in South Africa has particularly limited 
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distributional consequences268; (vi) net effects on the extent of competition269; (vii) 
legislative aspects270; (viii) and public support.271 These dimensions provide a broad 
framework within which incentive levers that use existing markets have been assessed 
here. 
 
4.1.2.1 Positive incentives that use existing markets 
The design of positive economic incentives allows for their activation, as possible new 
courses of action, through market processes or other economic instruments like taxation. 
In turn these motivate private decisions to act for gain. Thus they operate by moulding 
and encouraging certain kinds of behaviour in the private sphere.272 A hypothetical claim 
about incentive levers that is particularly relevant to this discussion is that when they are 
put into use in countries with resource constraints, they will achieve desired levels of 
environmental protection at least cost to society.273  
 
Positive incentives are generated by rewarding actions that have environmental 
consequences beneficial to the broader sectors of society. Thus, if feasible, the creation of 
such incentives promises to be a valuable tool for steering private economic behaviour 
towards biodiversity conservation objectives. But their effectiveness, first, in raising 
revenue for environmental protection and, second, in curing market failure has come 
under criticism.274 So the concerns expressed under these two heads must govern 
successful implementation of the polluter-pays-principle in South Africa, although the 
substance of the alleged deficiencies is not pursued here for lack of space.275  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
capacity to administer. Therefore mechanisms and incentives devices that relieve this burden on the state 
are desirable for that additional reason.   
267
 How accrued revenue should be used is a pressing question about taxes. The fact that earmarking 
revenue for dedicated environmental purposes does not appeal to fiscal authorities is a concern. But a 
degree of earmarking of accrued revenue to meet administrative costs in implementing an instrument may 
well be important to its durability as a policy initiative. In using tax benefits to mould the behavior of 
economic agents towards conservation, revenue is not raised for the state so these concerns are secondary.   
268
 Equity is the concern here, in a horizontal  interpretation, namely, the uniform impact of the instrument 
across persons of equal economic standing, and a vertical one, that is, the differential impact of the 
instrument across different income groups.  
269
 Instruments cannot be allowed to undermine the competitiveness of local industry in domestic and 
international markets.  
270
 The implementation of instruments has to be legislatively feasible, which has been shown in this paper 
not to be problematic in many cases, as well as giving effect to South Africa’s commitments under 
conventions we are party to internationally.  
271
 It needs to be established whether public support for implementation of the instrument is likely. In 
practice this will be reflected in the probable personal benefit perceived in the eye of the individual or 
enterprise. Public benefits are unlikely to instigate sufficient buy-in.    
272
 Inc. (2003) Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection and Conservation: Lessons from 
Canada. Prepared for the External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, Government of Canada. 
(obtainable on www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/smartreg-regint/en/06/01/su-11.html#exec), accessed 21/11/2007. 
273
 Harlan “Policies in the new millennium” (supra note 27). 
274
 P G W Henderson ‘Fiscal Incentives for Environmental Protection- The Way Forward’ (1995) South 
African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, vol 2 151 at 152. 
275
 The weaknesses of market-based tools in reducing and remedying negative externalities, like over-
exploiting open-access resources and misperceiving pollution damage, will be discussed further below. 
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A proposition that animates this thesis, already stated and reiterated in different contexts 
below, is that ecological goods and services not readily priced can be incorporated into 
decision arenas through the use of incentive devices. But a weakness that endures is 
uncertainty over the accuracy of methods to quantify these costs. Some researchers have 
suggested, given the range of prospective environmental crises, including the reduction of 
biodiversity, that current and future generations in South Africa face, that implementation 
should nonetheless proceed on the basis of estimations.276 In other words one should 
‘ensure that resilience is maintained, even though the limits on the nature and scale of 
economic activities thus required are necessarily uncertain.’277 Given the growing status 
of the precautionary principle in international environmental law, as well as its mention 
in the bulk of new natural resource legislation in South Africa, this is a position that 
merits attention. But bearing in mind the potential inefficiency in the allocation of 
valuable resources that could result, this may be a question best left to the economists, 
statisticians and accountants to answer.   
 
 Subsidies  Subsidies may vary in the way they are implemented and the environmental 
sector in which they are introduced.278 But in general operation they comprise financial 
assistance in the form of a grant or preferential tax treatment. It is given by the state to 
private enterprises in order to promote behaviour that benefits broader society and that is 
of strategic importance to the economy.279 Help rendered to meet obligations is 
contingent on the performance of stipulated actions by private beneficiaries.280 
Biodiversity conservation constitutes an undisputed benefit to society, although its 
quantification by a multi-variable index and its monetary valuation is both difficult and 
contentious. So subsidies could be used in principle to promote activities in the private 
sector that intentionally serve to sustain biodiversity.  
 
Although subsidies can potentially be used to promote sustainability and conserve 
biodiversity these payments are plagued by two overriding concerns. First, they are 
claimed not to comply effectively enough with the polluter-pays principle.281 Secondly, 
even if they promote sustainability in an activity, they can be perverse in the way they 
operate if the subsidised activity is environmentally harmful to start off with. For 
                                                 
276
 Henderson “Fiscal incentives- the way forward” (supra note 274) at 153.  
277
 Arrow “Economic growth and carrying capacity” (supra note 214) at 521. 
278
 For an overview 
 
 of the sectors suitable for subsidy implementation see: OECD Subsidy Reform and Sustainable 
Development: Economic, Environmental and Social Aspects (2006) OECD Publishing; OECD 
Environmentally Harmful Subsidies: Challenges for Reform (2005) OECD Publishing; OECD 
Environmentally Harmful Subsidies: Policy Issues and Challenges (2003) OECD Publishing; United 
Nations Environmental Program Energy Subsidies: Lessons Learned in Assessing their Impact and 
Designing Policy Reforms (2003) United Nations Foundation. 
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 N Myers and J Kent Perverse Subsidies- How Tax Dollars can Undercut the Environment and the 
Economy (2001) Island Press, Washington DC at 5. 
280
 S E Gaines and R A Westin (eds.) Taxation for environmental protection: a multinational legal study 
(1991), Quorum Books, New York.  
281
 A Framework for Considering Market-Based Instruments to Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in 
South Africa: A Discussion Document (2003) National Treasury (Tax Policy Chief Directorate) at 89. This 
point will be expanded below in the discussion of indirect subsidies or tax benefits. 
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instance, if given to enterprises engaging in agriculture, mining or forestry activities, the 
financial assistance provisions of the NWA, if the assistance contributes to the financial 
viability of the harmful activity, could operate as a perverse incentive.282  
 
Section 8 of CARA283 empowers the minister to establish schemes whereby financial 
assistance ‘out of moneys appropriated by Parliament’284 can be used to subsidise the 
activities of landowners285 in furtherance of the objectives of the Act, including 
conservation-related exercises relevant to biodiversity conservation.286 Thus the subsidy 
could have a dual function here when operating within an instituted scheme. Firstly, it 
could urge farmers to join the scheme, and secondly, it could pay them for services that 
cannot be rewarded through market creation or other incentive-based conservation 
mechanisms because they are neither recognised nor valued.  
 
It is arguable that schemes could be designed to further certain objectives of CARA 
provided that they are conservation based and not aimed at promoting agricultural 
production.287 Private land owners could voluntarily join schemes and in doing so 
commit themselves to furthering the particular objectives of CARA identified by the 
program. Such schemes though would have to contain criteria that the farmers would be 
required to fulfil before membership of the program is granted them.  
 
Examples of the characteristics to be considered before membership is granted could be 
(1) whether the farmer has demonstrated environmental achievements; (2) have 
implemented an effective environmental management system; and (3) demonstrated 
continual compliance with the Act. Designed schemes falling within this basic framework 
could be set up in a way that provides positive incentives288 like financial grants to land 
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 Section 61.  
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 Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act 43 of 1983 (CARA). 
284
 CARA Section 8(1). 
285
 Listed in Section 8(1)(a)(i-vii). The most relevant provision is 8(1)(a)(vii), in that it provides for the 
payment of subsidies in respect of ‘the performance…of anything else which improves soil fertility or 
counteracts the vulnerability of soil to erosion’.  
286
 Section 8 (1) (i) to (vii) refer to an extensive list including subsidy for soil conservation works, 
reductions of domestic animal numbers, land restoration, cultivation of particular crops (these could be 
indigenous), and the combating of weeds and invasive plants. Section 8 (2) states that different schemes 
may be established for different areas, and that the schemes may differ between the particular areas for 
which they are established. Section 9(1) (e) provides further that the Minister may determine requirements 
that need to be complied with in order for landowners to qualify for assistance under the Act.  
287
 Such as the case where a subsidy scheme is to facilitate agricultural development by resource poor 
farmers, implemented by GN 1036 in Government Gazette 30427 dated 31 October 2007 under the NWA. 
Such a scheme can be designed to develop sustainable irrigation schemes so that subsistence farmers can 
provide food for their families and ultimately turn their activities commercial. Although CARA wears two 
hats when it comes to balancing agricultural development with conservation, this scheme certainly focuses 
on the former objective and is to that extent less likely to benefit biodiversity in the long-run.    
288
 It needs noting here that regulatory incentives could be put in place that operate in the same way. An 
example of a regulatory incentive would be if, once a land owner becomes a member of a scheme, they 
become eligible for rewards in meeting regulations. Requirements could be, firstly, flexibility on the permit 
conditions for certain activities or for modifications that would normally require environmental 
authorization. Secondly, there would be a reduction in reporting obligations and the relaxing of state 
monitoring on owner activities. For such mechanisms to be effective, of course, their applicability needs to 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  
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owners that register as members of the particular program for the region within which 
they own land.  
 
As a further instance, the state could promote the formation of environmental 
management plans by specialists and encourage the implementation of these plans by 
private owners for whose land the plans were designed. If the plans, when put into 
practice, are likely to entail financial loss to the land-owners, then the state can offset the 
costs of implementation by subsidising it with a grant. Or the farmers who are 
implementing the plan could be granted lower taxes on the goods they produce than 
farmers producing the same goods but without adhering to an environmental management 
plan. To qualify for such a subsidy or tax benefit the farmers would, firstly, have to have 
in place at a sub-level an environmental management plan aligned with the objectives of 
CARA, and secondly, be managing their agricultural resources in a way that is approved 
by the relevant Conservation Advisory Board.289  
 
Subsidies would reward above-average environmental performers, which is their main 
rationale. The existence of these schemes would also act as an inducement to conform for 
land-owners who do not fulfil the environmental requirements needed to join the scheme. 
Non-members would have to increase their performance in environmental preservation in 
order to qualify for admittance to capitalise on the financial and regulatory benefits 
available under such schemes. 
 
To join a scheme certain private land-owners can be presumed to require technical 
assistance in the form of landscape assessments by independent specialists and land 
management recommendations that follow. The specialist advice about transforming 
land-use practices towards becoming ecologically sustainable could be highly beneficial 
to the farmers. For instance, the potential increase in long-term production yields 
resulting from the implementation of the management recommendations could constitute 
one example of a reward to the farmer for joining the schemes. Of course this depends on 
the quality and applicability in practice of the technical advice given.   
 
In theory, schemes could be aligned also with the objectives for which conservation 
committees are first established.290 The subsidies available under schemes could then be 
used to foster co-operative public support in providing incentives to land-owners to join 
conservation committees. Although the mechanisms for such alignment are explicitly set 
out in Sections 8 and 9 of CARA, it may be feasible to implement similar proposals 
under other conservation legislation that has provisions allowing for financial assistance. 
 
As mentioned already, the NWA has financial assistance provisions of relevance because 
water resources are vital components of a region’s biodiversity status. Section 32 (b) of 
the Biodiversity Act provides further that funds not required immediately for policy use 
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 Section 17 (2) establishes a board that advises the minister on ‘(b) the desirability of establishing a 
specified scheme, and the provisions of any scheme; and (c) any other matter arising from the application 
of this Act or a scheme, or which it may deem necessary in order to achieve the objects of this Act or which 
the Minister may refer to it for advice.’ 
290
 See section 3 of this dissertation. 
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by the Minister can be channelled into any venture seen as fit by state officials. As 
agriculture constitutes the biggest threat to biodiversity in this country, a scheme like the 
one outlined above for water permits could be a feasible option for the investment of such 
funds. However, in practice the government’s reluctance to support such policy avenues 
through direct subsidy is predictable as they fall on the expenditure side of the fiscal 
equation and once used for an unbudgeted purpose cannot readily be reclaimed for their 
original planned use.    
 
One important further consideration is that where grants or other forms of direct financial 
compensation supply the initial impetus for schemes to become operational, the process 
will not become sustainable unless institutions are in place to drive its operation in 
perpetuity. For instance, annual budget allocations are subject to political and economic 
vagaries in the short-term, so conservation expenditure has to compete periodically with 
many other demands on state resources. But if a fund devoted to environmental purposes 
is set up with legal safe-guards against other uses, known as ring fencing, there can be 
greater continuity and certainty in policy actions over time. 
 
Tax benefits  Tax benefits operate in much the same way as subsidies but they do not 
reward environmental performance directly with grants. Instead they operate by 
providing organisations and individuals with benefits in different forms of taxation 
reduced or foregone depending on the particular environmental outcome that is desired 
and the type of expense or donation being taxed. A prerequisite for making tax benefits 
effective tools for conservation is that the objectives they are designed to achieve must be 
first and foremost environmental protection.291 Judging from recent policy documents, 
this has not necessarily been the case.292  
 
In South Africa the enabling legislation in this regard is the Income Tax Act.293 Several 
other policy documents have pointed out the role fiscal incentives can play in 
environmental protection,294 the most important of these being the Draft Policy Paper for 
the National Treasury.295 Paterson296 has conducted in-depth analysis of the tax 
framework297 in its relation to environmental protection, in particular, which tax 
incentives exist that allow tax payers to support sustainable development initiatives. 
Numerous provisions can be interpreted as potential tax benefits for biodiversity 
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 As opposed to income generation for instance. 
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 A Framework for Considering Market-Based Instruments to Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in 
South Africa- Draft Policy Paper (2006) National Treasury (Tax Policy Chief Directorate) at 39. 
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 Income Tax Act (58 of 1962). 
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 See M Katz, D Davis,  J De V Graaf, P Du Toit, P Mohr, D Mokhatle and J Njeke Interim Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa (1994) at 88; Market-
Based Instruments to Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa: A Discussion Document 
(2003) National Treasury. 
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 National Treasury Paper (supra note 264). 
296
 A Paterson and T Winstanley ‘Improving the legislative approach to Biodiversity Conservation and 
Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in South Africa’ (2003), EnAct International.  
297
 Legislation comprising this framework includes the Income Tax Act (58 of 1962), the Local 
Government: Municipal Property Rates Act (6 of 2004), the Transfer Duty Act (40 of 1949) and the Estate 
Duty Act (45 of 1955). 
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conservation. Although they are relevant to this research, space limitations make a 
comprehensive overview of Paterson’s research here difficult.  
 
As is to be expected, tax benefits can be used in many spheres of private sector 
biodiversity conservation to streamline the implementation of a number of the 
mechanisms discussed above. Of particular relevance here are the tax provisions likely to 
have the biggest impact in motivating the formation and activities of sustainable user 
organisations.  Particularly relevant provisions in this regard include income tax298, 
property tax299, estate duty300 and transfer duty.301 
 
Unfortunately tax benefits suffer from two inherent problems mentioned above with 
regard to subsidies. Namely, they contravene the polluter-pays principle, and secondly, 
they can be perverse in effect.  
 
Firstly, to be consonant with the polluter-pays (or ‘user-pays’) principle,302 positive 
financial incentives for industries or resource users to lower their environmental impact 
cannot be subsidies or tax expenditures borne by other tax-payers. The latter are not the 
polluters. To be effective the costs otherwise imposed on the broader community must be 
internalised by the polluters regardless of whether they are investing resources in 
conservation technology or not. This requires that tax benefits to polluting users in a 
specific sector need to derive from activities in that sector to which the incentive is 
directed so as to achieve behaviour change. However in practice this principle is likely to 
prove elusive to implement here given the wide array of conservation opportunities that 
tax benefits afford.303  
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 Section 10 (1) (cN) of the Income Tax Act provides for the granting of income tax exemptions for 
receipts and accruals to public benefit organisations such as sustainable user organisations fostering 
biodiversity in a particular region. Section 10 (1) (cA) provides further that income tax exemptions can be 
granted to institutions conducting scientific or technical research as well as others that provide valuable 
services to the government. In theory private organisations adopting voluntary conservation initiatives fit 
well into this category, but they do not qualify as public benefit organisations. A further limitation of these 
provisions is that the conservation activities of the mining sector are income tax deductible. If it serves to 
make mining financially sustainable this incentive is perverse in the mining context, but could effectively 
be extended to other purely conservation based activities like biodiversity restoration. Links with other 
mechanisms can be established through section 18 (A) (1) in that it provides for donations made to 
organisations exempt under section 10 to be subject to income tax deductions.  
299
 As mentioned in section 2 of this thesis in relation to Paterson’s research (‘property tax for protected 
areas’), section 8 (2) read with 15 (2) of the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act (6 of 2004), 
property tax benefits should be granted to private land-owners who choose to initiate the designation 
process of making their land protected.  
300
 According to section 4 (h) of the Estate Duty Act, estate duty deductions may be granted for the same 
range of organisations listed under section 10 of the Income Tax Act. 
301
 Section 9 (c) of the Transfer Duty Act provides that transfer duty exemptions may be granted to 
organisations in respect of property they acquire providing that the property will be used for the public 
benefit or the organisations that the property is transferred to are listed in terms of section 10 (1) of the 
Income Tax Act.  This could be a particularly effective tool in protected area transfers, if the public benefit 
organisation is planning on preserving land transferred for biodiversity purposes. This is for the public 
benefit and therefore eligible. 
302Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration is on internalization of environmental costs; thus it reflects the 
polluter-pays-principle.   
303
 Administrative complexity is consequently an additional consideration. 
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Secondly, by way of illustration, paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 to the Income Tax Act has 
provisions that relate to the deduction – from taxable income - of expenditure that a 
farmer incurs, for example, while eradicating noxious plants. Likewise Section 17A 
refers to compensation regarding expenditures incurred in preventing or repairing soil 
erosion. Provided that the soil-erosion works are approved under section 40 of CARA, 
expenditures incurred by farmers in combating soil erosion may benefit from tax 
incentives in accordance with the Income Tax Act. The amount of income tax that the 
taxpayer investing in soil erosion works is required to pay can theoretically be reduced to 
zero.304 However if these provisions are used to make agricultural activities financially 
viable they are operating in a perverse way because agriculture, regardless of whether it 
is sustainable or not, tends to be a threat to biodiversity.  
 
General weaknesses of positive incentives  If there was a consistent method of pricing 
environmental externalities then the role that fiscal incentives could play in 
environmental protection would be much clearer. Much disagreement continues over the 
methods needed to do this. The precautionary principle pushes towards calculating 
externalities on the high side in order to cater for unforeseen considerations negative in 
effect. But it needs to be kept in mind that the principal function of fiscal tools like taxes 
and subsidies is to modify individual behaviour in pursuit of utility maximisation. If 
perceived as arbitrary and excessive by payers, the taxes levied on some resource users 
and polluters may create hostility in the individuals liable for the tax.305 All tax systems 
rely on voluntary compliance by the greater majority of assessed recipients of income or 
wealth accrual, so any increase in tax evasion is highly undesirable to fiscal authorities. 
 
Fiscal incentives applied for environmental protection presupposes the obligation resting 
on governments to intervene actively in the environment.306 But such intervention is held 
by certain thinkers like libertarians to conflict with the idea of a free-market economy and 
its presumed efficiency in allocating resources. This is controversial but potentially 
important as a broadly competitive market base provides the impetus and the rationale for 
the implementation of other mechanisms that create markets in order to function 
efficiently, like the tradable water authorisations previously discussed.  
 
Of direct relevance also are the equity concerns contained in much of South Africa’s 
natural resource legislation. These demonstrate that the principle of maintaining a free 
market economy for efficient allocation is not absolute. Certain considerations like social 
justice and state intervention to protect the environment can and do justify the breach of 
this freedom of action in free markets principle. But this is not to say that there is no 
room for robust disagreement in the analysis and policy implications of both the principle 
and deliberate breaches of it.  
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 A realistic example is where a mining company buys a piece of land upon which they hope to obtain the 
right to mine. They are granted the right and then mine the land. After mining activities have ceased, the 
company rehabilitates the land and a closure certificate is issued. If instead of selling off the piece of land 
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if the mining company spends on soil erosion works it can claim the deduction against its taxable income.   
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 Henderson “Fiscal incentives - the way forward” (supra note 274) at 151. 
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 Henderson “Fiscal Incentives – introduction” (supra note 219) at 49. 
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The Margo Commission307 stated that it is desirable that incentive devices involving costs 
granted in one sphere of production be paid for elsewhere in the economy as a whole. To 
illustrate, if one farmer is given a property tax break for submitting his/her land for 
declaration as a protected area, then the revenue lost by the state in providing this 
incentive could be made up by charging higher user charges for water in the region. In 
such instances tax incentives are not useful for internalising environmental costs.  
 
Creating positive incentives is the aim of tax expenditures, like tax holidays or 
exemptions.308 Therefore some proportion of the cost of their implementation must be 
borne by the broader tax-paying community. As remarked above, the obligation on the 
polluter to pay is in conflict here with the use of positive incentives to protect the 
environment. Considering that the common goal of these approaches that potentially 
work against each other is biodiversity protection, some utility-maximising balance has to 
be struck between efficiency, equity and environmental integrity.   
 
4.1.2.2 Disincentives 
The incentive devices discussed below are considered negative in that they discourage by 
penalising non-compliance with standards or objectives set by regulation. Failure to meet 
established objectives has a destructive impact on biodiversity in many cases. So the 
vehicle used to minimise damaging activities is the imposition of costs on the perpetrator.  
 
With a major proportion of natural resources in South Africa shifted into public 
trusteeship the private-public ownership divide has disappeared in many sectors. In other 
words, the environmental dimensions of natural resources are deemed to be in the public 
trust, so private enterprises have to apply to the government for rights to use and access a 
particular resource. Once user rights are granted to a private entity, the activity of 
exploitation is deemed to take place in the private sphere. Even though the resource use is 
in principle happening under strict state regulation, there is still a need for safeguarding 
mechanisms to be in place to ensure that all negative externalities are internalised by the 
rights-holder. Policy approaches to this end translate in many cases into the establishment 
of disincentives or avoidance devices.309 
 
 
Regulations have the capacity to modify the legal framework applicable to private 
resource-using organisations. For instance, a regulation may entail private decision-takers 
determining in advance of an investment whether authorisation fees will increase and 
whether permit requirements will stay the same over the life of the project. These will 
affect its projected profitability. Thus private organisations need to assess whether their 
activities will be compliant, that is, in accordance with the framework in place which 
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 Report of the Commission of inquiry into the Tax Structure of the Republic of South Africa (RP 
34/1987). (Chairman: Mr Justice CS Margo- ‘the Margo Report’) cited in Henderson “Fiscal incentives – 
conceptual framework” (supra note 221) at 55. 
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 Henderson “Fiscal incentives – conceptual framework” (supra note 221). 
309
 The system of direct regulation in South African environmental law comprises the use of penalties, 
permits and requirements for monitoring and enforcement of regulatory conditions in practice.     
 59 
provides the motivation for them to acquiesce. The rewards for complying can range 
from simply avoiding the payment of penalties to new opportunities for anticipating and 
accessing future economic gains.     
 
As previously remarked, these instruments are based broadly on the international 
environmental law principle of the polluter or user pays.310 Most important on the debit 
side of the balance sheet, prevention or mitigation costs arising from environmental 
damage must be internalised – recognised and acted upon - by the responsible enterprise 
rather than be imposed on society at large.  
 
Information permitting, explicit charges are attached directly or indirectly to activities 
that diminish environmental values such as loss of biodiversity. In this use they are 
negative measures in that they impose costs to discourage unwanted behaviour. These 
charges need to make up for the impact of the damaging activity on all sectors of present 
society, as well as the environmental impacts likely to be experienced by generations 
peopling future societies.311 In this way environmental costs that would previously have 
been unaccounted for would now be dealt with through assigning responsibility to the 
users of natural resources who are likely to impinge on biodiversity.312 These are ideal 
outcomes not easily realised for multiple reasons as we have argued throughout this 
thesis.  
 
Performance Bonds  As policy instruments, performance bonds require that a 
government body, designated with the responsibility to administer use of a natural 
resource, has to be provided with a bond as a form of financial security by the private 
enterprise that is using the resource and likely to modify a natural habitat. In other words, 
a resource user pays an advance fee or financial guarantee to the government as one of 
the requirements laid down in the approval process regarding the operations they hope to 
engage in.  
 
Thereby the government authority is guaranteed sufficient funds to cover costs of 
rehabilitation in the event of a resource being unsustainably exploited or that the indirect 
impacts on biodiversity are unacceptable. In theory this is so regardless of the liable 
company’s financial situation after the damage is incurred.313 The funds are held by the 
relevant authority and are returned on condition that the company meets the stipulated 
environmental objectives. The value of the bond is dictated by market competition for 
access to the resource, so a key function of the mechanism is that it influences individual 
behaviour. Posting a bond acts as a negative incentive to resource users in that it 
discourages actions that may have unfavourable environmental consequences. Bonds can 
be applied flexibly by taking various forms in a number of settings including mining, 
forestry, agriculture and development programmes.314 Repayment can be withheld in 
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 The polluter-pays-principle holds that polluters when using resources should internalize all the 
environmental externalities of their activities. These can be positive as well as negative. 
311
 This is an ideal still beyond the current state of knowledge held by researchers and policy-makers. 
312
 This could occur either directly or as a by-product of an activity. 
313
 If biodiversity impacts occur as an external effect of the economic activity taking place, for example. 
314
 J Shogren, J Herriges and R Govindasamy ‘Limits to Environmental Bonds’ (1993) Ecological 
Economics 8 (2) 109-133; L Cornwell and R Costanza ‘Chapter 13: Environmental Bonds- Implementing 
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proportional amounts to the degree of assessed impact on the environment once the 
activity for which the bond has been put up has ceased.  
 
So in design performance bonds assist biodiversity conservation by providing a financial 
guarantee that the biodiversity rehabilitation for which the bond is submitted is in 
principle secured regardless of the outcome of a destructive activity. An incentive is 
created for the private organisation submitting the bond to achieve a specific objective in 
order to secure some return from the bond. In cases where the natural status of a 
landscape needs to be preserved, other factors relevant to biodiversity conservation will 
need to be considered like species survival and erosion-based loss of soil. However the 
reactionary nature of a bond – reacting after the fact - renders it unable to deal with 
consequences like species extinction or other irreversible impacts on biodiversity.315 This 
makes it less useful than the other disincentive instruments discussed below.  
 
A range of forms exist316 by which bond finance can be provided by the resource user. 
These are potentially useful in all environmental sectors, including fishing, agriculture, 
mining, forestry, water management, and general infrastructural development. The 
Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (28 of 2002, the MPRDA)317 
specifies financial provisions of this kind, for example.318 On a lesser scale, performance 
bond-like provisions appear in the NWA with regard to water use;319 in the MLRA in the 
context of foreign fishing;320 and in NEMA regarding extensive development projects.321 
For the present purpose, performance bonds in the context of mining are the focus of 
attention, with the MPRDA provisions discussed as illustrations of the general 
opportunities and constraints that the use of performance bonds present. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Precautionary Principle in Environmental Policy’ in C Raffensperger and J Tickner (eds) Protecting 
Public Health and the Environment (1999) Island Press, Washington DC at 220-240. 
315
 Performance bonds also do not motivate companies to take measures that reduce the impact of their 
activities on the landscape in the first place. They require only that companies invest sufficient money to 
cover the rehabilitation of damaged landscapes and do not promote preventative or even precautionary 
measures that minimize impact. In the case of non-renewable resources this is a pertinent concern in 
allowing depletion that cannot be restored.  
316
 One is the commitment upfront of capital funding. Guarantees for adherence to environmental 
protection standards can also be obtained by the government authority through resource users paying risk 
premiums to insurance companies, the establishment of dedicated trust funds; bank guarantees; or 
mandatory liability insurance. 
317
 Section 41 prescribes that applicants for prospecting or mining rights and mining permits make financial 
provision for negative environmental impacts that could result from the activity prior to the environmental 
management plans (prospecting rights and mining permits) and environmental management programs 
(mining rights) being approved. This will be discussed further below. 
318
 A Mining and Mineral Policy for South Africa (1998) Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(http://www.dme.gov.za/publications/wp_min/whitepaper.html) endorses the use of (i) disincentives for 
retention of mineral rights (translated into mining rights under the MPRDA) and (ii) incentives to 
encourage beneficiation. As they are posed in this policy document, these incentives can affect perversely a 
range of landscape considerations impacting on biodiversity. 
319
 Section 30 provides for financial security to be put up by the water user to ensure that all conditions 
under which the water authorization was granted are fulfilled. 
320
 Section 39 (4) provides that foreign fishing vessels exploiting fisheries in the EEZ put up financial 
guarantee that they will fulfil their obligations under the MLRA. 
321
 Section 24 (5) (d) provides for the state’s requirement of financial security to ensure that conditions of 
environmental authorizations are adhered to by the recipient. 
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As reiterated throughout this thesis, where threatened natural resources exist on private 
land but are in the public trust, state ownership of a particular resource is not a 
prerequisite for government to act as the sole authority allocating use rights.322 Therefore 
in principle the use of performance bonds could be extended to other natural resource 
sectors, like commercial fishing licenses for domestic companies and foreign companies 
applying for bio-prospecting licences.323  
 
Performance bonds could be used in these new ways to ensure, for instance, that foreign 
pharmaceutical companies comply with their statutory obligations to conserve, and that 
authorities if the need arises could tap into the bond proceeds to restore natural capital 
where companies do not comply. Biodiversity permitting provisions could be useful to 
implement performance bonds along these lines but the statutory feasibility of this has to 
be assessed.   
 
In the Biodiversity Act the set of interests to be protected prior to the issue of bio-
prospecting permits is extremely complex. These range from assurance that there has 
been full disclosure and prior consent from stakeholders to the establishment of material 
transfer, as well as benefit-sharing agreements between local stakeholders and bio-
prospecting companies.324 If performance bonds were deployed here as an alternative 
lever of control this might streamline the administrative process as there would be less 
pressure on authorities to ensure in advance whether bio-prospecting companies have 
fulfilled all their obligations under the act. It would also ensure that bio-prospecting 
companies come to see it in their self-interest to abide by the provisions.  
 
Performance bonds could be useful tools in circumstances where there is disagreement in 
deciding whether the Precautionary Principle325 has been adhered to or not. For instance, 
with regard to genetic modification, performance bonds could be a valuable tool. A major 
concern with GMOs326 is that there is significant uncertainty in the science applicable 
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 In South Africa, particularly concerning natural resource use and access, there are a number of other 
factors likely to be considered at least as important as environmental performance when authorizations to 
exploit are issued. It will be argued below that the most pertinent of these are socio-economic in nature. 
Given the political dispensation that dictated natural resource use and access in the past (when natural 
resource use benefited mainly a small section of the population), in many instances what the socio-
economic dimension of a policy equates to in contemporary South Africa is transformation. 
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 That is, exploiting plants with potential medicinal uses.  
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 Section 82. 
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 This principle recognises uncertainty in current scientific knowledge and reflects the scope for 
environmental measures that anticipate possible revisions on the basis of future changes in scientific 
knowledge. The principle reverses the normal burden of proof and places it on the person or persons who 
intend carrying out an activity that may cause environmental harm. However, the legal status of the 
Precautionary Principle is highly controversial and there have also been disagreements over its exact 
meaning. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration is a widely accepted expression of the Precautionary 
Principle. Other formulations of the principle appear in the Preamble to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and in article 3 of the Framework Convention on Climate Change. In South Africa it is reflected 
as a principle of NEMA, appearing too in numerous other pieces of sectoral environmental legislation. 
326
 ‘Genetically modified organisms’ 
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over whether there are likely to be unforeseen environmental impacts resulting from 
genetic modification.  
 
Financial guarantees could be required prior to authorisation for the release of GMOs into 
the environment being granted. This is especially relevant considering that R. 386 of the 
NEMA Regulations 327 concerns “The release of genetically modified organisms into the 
environment in instances where assessment is required by the Genetically Modified 
Organisms Act, 1997 (Act No.15 of 1997)”. This refers to the listed activity number 21 
that may not commence without environmental authorisation from the competent 
authority, and which is not forthcoming without an EIA initially having taken place. Yet 
somewhat paradoxically there is no EIA required under the GMO Act for the release of 
GMOs into the environment.328 Companies like Monsanto who engage actively in genetic 
modification experiments and fund numerous university-based research projects could be 
required to put up performance bonds that serve to protect biodiversity from the 
unforeseen impacts of new kinds of genetic material.  
 
But as a policy measure performance bonds in this context are not optimal. If irreversible 
impacts occur as a result of genetic modification then no amount of money is sufficient to 
rectify this situation. Yet they could be used as a means to make scientists more aware 
and more cautious about the range of possible environmental effects. Currently the 
broader population are forced to accept the word of geneticists on this issue. So viewed 
performance bonds complement the NEMA principles of increasing precaution as well as 
public participation.     
 
The MPRDA is an example of South African natural resource law that relies on the use of 
performance bonds. The MPRDA requires financial provision in the cases of prospecting 
rights, mining rights and mining permits aimed at land rehabilitation329 along with 
environmental impact management once mining operations have ceased.330  
 
The MPRDA provides for annual reassessment by independent assessors331 of the mining 
operations for which financial insurance has been provided. One drawback of the 
MPRDA financial provisions is that the obligations of the mineral resource users 
terminate once a closure certificate is issued to them by the DME. This is a weakness of 
the stipulation in that if funds provided as insurance are returned on issue of the closure 
                                                 
327
 In the List of activities and competent authorities identified in terms of sections 24 and 24D of the 
National Environmental Management Act, 1998.  
328
 Listing such an activity under the NEMA regulations is therefore pointless. It is also misleading in that it 
gives the reader of these listed activities the impression that the release of GMOs into the environment is 
being guided on some level by EIA generated information as required by a different piece of legislation. 
This is not the case. 
329
 Section 43. 
330
 The Department of Minerals and Energy (the DME) either specifies a bank account for the resource user 
to deposit the required money into or a bank has to provide a financial guarantee for environmental 
rehabilitation costs on behalf of its client, the applicant company or individual. The other form of financial 
provision provided for by section 41 (1) of the MPRDA is the formation of a trust fund with the state as 
listed beneficiary.  
331
 They have to be wholly independent of the company authorized to mine the resource.  
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certificate, no further financial contribution is available for damage to biodiversity that 
may become apparent after the closure certificate has been issued.  
 
Performance bonds by design provide two levels of incentives for mining companies. 
There is the spur for them to meet the environmental objectives set so that they are 
reimbursed with the funds put up for the bond. But there is a second level of incentive in 
that companies need to meet the environmental objectives in order not to jeopardise their 
reputation, and thus the granting or renewal of authorisations by the state in the future. 
One example in South Africa is the renewal of a Mining Right. According to the 
MPRDA, there is no limit on the number of times the thirty year mining right can be 
renewed.332 So once a mining right is issued to a company it has a compelling economic 
motive to retain the right as long as mineral deposits are accessible.   
 
Innovations in their use can turn performance bonds into positive instruments too. One 
example is the implementation of tax-exempt financing.333 The interest accruing on the 
bond originally issued to cover environmental degradation or unforeseen pollution, when 
paid to the company could be wholly or partly exempted from income tax. This depends 
on the assessed state of the environment due for rehabilitation once mining activities 
cease. This would serve as a positive incentive to mining companies in that they would 
try to lower environmental impacts in order to enjoy additional economic gains during 
the process. However if this should operate as an increased revenue margin that makes a 
mining venture viable, it could clearly have perverse effects by raising the probability of 
damage occurring. 
 
The amount of income tax that the company is obligated to pay could be modified so as 
to be proportioned to the degradation of the environment before landscape rehabilitation 
activities begin. This would mean that mining companies would be more wary of 
destroying the environment despite having a licence to exploit, and also because 
repayment of the bond to them depends on rehabilitation rather than on preventative 
measures. The emphasis in their behaviour during production could shift towards the 
prevention more than the amelioration of damage through restoration.   
 
Although there is a clear incentive for resource users to comply in order to recoup the 
funds they put up for the bond, there is no additional compensation available for resource 
users who show above-average levels of environmental performance.334 In other words, 
in this instrument the reward is static and no additional reward accrues to resource users 
who go beyond the basic compliance standards. This is a limitation. 
 
                                                 
332
 Section 24(4). 
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 The application of this provision in US jurisdiction is outlined clearly by Henderson in “Fiscal 
incentives – the way forward” (supra note 274) at 164, although a similar scheme is available under South 
Africa’s Income Tax Act.  
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 Performance bonds place responsibility on the consumer of the natural resource but do not evidence the 
capacity, as devices, to reduce the overall consumption of natural resources, nor to motivate higher 
efficiency and intensity in user mitigation behaviour beyond the compliance standards.  
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If regulations set a threshold for rehabilitation liability,335 are resource users not likely to 
get as close as feasible to the threshold that constitutes environmental damage? This is a 
possibility as it would be the least-cost strategy for resource users in some cases. Thus a 
degree of flexibility is required that gives authorities leeway to decide under specified 
circumstances whether a part of the bond should be withheld for rehabilitation even after 
the closure certificates are issued.336 Otherwise there is no legal provision that protects 
mined landscapes in perpetuity.  
 
This discussion raises the question whether piecemeal use of financial security measures 
in exploitation of non-renewable resources may not be suitable where irreversible 
environmental damage is a possibility? By definition no financial expenditure can 
rehabilitate irreversible impacts on landscapes within realistic time-scales. This is the 
dilemma of the Brazilian rain forests337 and the Siberian tundra.338 Where irreversible 
damage is possible – interpreting the word irreversible with a time dimension long in 
human lifespan terms - then performance bonds should be supplemented by direct 
regulation with criminal sanctions.  
 
If this conjecture is correct it follows that it would have been appropriate if the 
contravention of financial provisions under the MPRDA had been listed as a Schedule 3 
offence. Then, if financial securities are not sufficient to cover environmental damage, a 
mining company would have an additional disincentive to avoid triggering Schedule 3 
penalties. Applied in such instances the criminal sanctions under NEMA would be acting 
as a last resort or ‘long-stop’ policy action.339   
 
The problem of placing a market value on the impact, positive or negative, on the 
environment is a persistent consideration here. Once the extractive activity for which the 
bond has been put up ceases then the holder of the bond, an agency of the state, needs to 
evaluate whether there are harmful environmental consequences caused by that activity.  
Impact costs need to be calculated in monetary terms in order for it to be subtracted from 
the bond value payable to the economic agent. Where resources are non-renewable and 
damage judged to be irreversible, that such calculations are difficult and subject to 
dispute goes without elaboration.  
 
On the other hand, if resource users need to raise bank loans to cover this funding 
requirement, then meeting the interest on the loan may itself constitute a financial burden 
on them. This could retard mining development by weakening the incentive to invest 
within the mining industry as whole. Section 2 (e) of the MPRDA points out that 
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promoting mineral resource development, along with environmental protection, is a key 
objective of the MPRDA. One objective needs to be achieved concurrently with the 
other. 
 
In addition it would help if low-interest loans – lower than market rates because of the 
subsidy - are made available to finance mining projects. This presupposes though that 
such loans are earmarked for performance bonds devoted to R&D investment aimed at 
modifying extraction technology in favour of conservation. By offsetting the costs of 
getting a loan, such interventions through subsidies may also enable authorities to 
increase the value of performance bonds required from private developers in certain 
cases. They provide more resources to rehabilitate biodiversity, while enabling more 
companies to access the market and potentially raise competitive pressures. But like all 
interventions using public funds a great deal hinges on accurate estimation of benefits 
and opportunity costs. 
 
But like all resources drawn from state coffers for a defined purpose, the major 
consideration is the opportunity cost of spending for that purpose. If used for another 
desirable objective would this expenditure yield a higher or lower benefit to the public 
purse? Subsidies need to be carefully considered. There is the potential for low-interest 
loans to be counter-productive in the long run for the convincing reason that they could 
accelerate biodiversity degradation.  
 
Disposal Charges  It needs noting at the outset that compared to the other disincentive 
measures discussed here, disposal charges are of ancillary relevance to biodiversity 
conservation. Charges of this kind are imposed on an individual or organisation treated as 
a point source – the locus of responsibility – that is legally responsible for releasing 
pollutants into the environment. But disposal charges or taxes are not currently 
implemented in South Africa.340 They are important to biodiversity though in that, in 
principle, they can regulate the amount of harmful substances released into ecosystems 
by their deliberate deployment as devices to decrease the attraction of certain courses of 
action.341  
 
In theory, the charges levied on discharge activities could be prescribed by regulation. 
The charges could differentiate between outcomes by setting standards for type and 
amount of waste, the manner of disposal, the reception location of disposal and 
recycling.342 Simply put, the rationale behind a disposal charge system would be to 
provide a positive incentive for water users to comply with a standard that is 
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 Although DWAF is in the process of developing a Waste Discharge System which imposes a set of 
tiered charges on water users. Information on the system is obtainable from Water Quality Management 
Series (Sub-Series No. MS11) ‘Towards a Strategy for a Waste Discharge Charge System’ (First Edition) 
(2003) Department of Water Affairs and Forestry.  
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 Section 74 (s) of the National Environmental Management: Waste Management Bill provides for the 
minister to use incentives and disincentives with regard to waste management. 
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 An example of existing legislation providing for considerations like the 
se is the NEMA: Air Quality Act (39 of 2004). Section 53 (c) provides for the minister to make regulations 
regarding ‘…emissions, including the prohibition of specific emissions, from point, non-point and mobile 
sources of emissions…’  
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recommended but not necessarily prescribed, whereas disincentives would be created to 
discourage activities in which maximum allowable standards are exceeded. To obtain 
perspective, private behaviour choices are conceived as comprising a spectrum. On one 
end adherence to recommended standards is motivated by reward. On the other exceeding 
prescribed allowable standards is discouraged through disincentives. Yet the functional 
merits of such a system in practice are still not decidable in South Africa.      
 
One foreseeable problem is that disposal charges levied by the government for a 
particular activity may not be attuned to the environmental specificities of the area in 
which the activity is taking place. For instance, in certain areas the quantity of pesticide 
that the environment has the capacity to absorb sustainably may be higher than in others. 
In these resistant areas the need to reward farmers for lowering the usage of pesticides 
will be less than other areas that have greater sensitivity to latent levels of persistent 
chemicals in the soil and water reserves. The baseline or average use of insecticides can 
be presumed to vary considerably across different agricultural and ecological habitats. If 
product charges are not linked directly to identified environmental problems343 then their 
application may add to the production costs incurred by a sub-set of land-users whose 
activities are not imposing an unsustainable impact on the environment. Such additional 
costs would ultimately be borne by the local community as a whole.344 
 
License fees  Licence fees are most commonly imposed by the state on private sector 
activities that impinge on resources under administration, like waters for fishing, game 
habitats and natural forests. These may directly affect biodiversity through the 
exploitation of indigenous species or indirectly modify habitats in the case of mining, 
water authorisations345 and development approvals. There are a range of variant licence 
fees. A factor common to them all though is that the amount of fees can in principle be 
proportioned to the environmental externalities within the sector to which they are 
applied.346 But quantifying the externalities in practice remains the biggest hurdle.   
 
The precondition for this tool to function efficiently, and to motivate private resource 
users to pay licence fees, is the existence of binding legislation that is well-designed for 
this purpose. Certain requirements stipulated in law have to be fulfilled by resource users 
before authorisations are granted to them by the relevant authorities. Meeting these 
requirements makes their economic activities legal.  
 
As mentioned previously, because certain key natural resources are in the public trust in 
South Africa, like water and minerals, resource users are obliged to apply to the state for 
authorisation to exploit a particular resource deposit. This can translate into a licence fee 
payable as a pre-condition for authorisation. Revenue raised from licence fees can be 
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 Principle 16 of the White Paper on a National Water Policy for South Africa (1997) Department of 
water affairs and Forestry (http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Policies/NWRS/) emphasises how 
economic incentives generally and water pricing specifically can fund water resource management which 
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 An example would be the degree of the impact on biodiversity. 
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used to fund a multitude of environmental objectives, as well as the licence fee 
administrative costs. In principle they can also approximate the opportunity cost of 
depleting the natural resource held in the public trust together with the negative 
externalities imposed on the environment that occur as by-products of this use.  
 
 In South African natural resource legislation, paid licence fees confer authorisations for 
the private use of water,347 marine living resources,348 biological resources349 and 
minerals.350 Correctly designed these provisions can take account of the impact that direct 
extraction of these resources from the natural environment has on the extent of 
biodiversity. Thus indirect environmental externalities can be accounted for – in principle 
if not yet realistically - through licence fees required for development authorizations 
under NEMA351 and atmospheric emissions licences under NEM: AQA.352 
 
This selection of licence uses faces limits in achieving the objectives for which they are 
prescribed. An overriding reason for this is that they are often inadequately priced against 
the complex blend of administrative and environmental externalities which they are 
designed to resolve.353 A further reason for this limitation is that, because externalities 
like impact on biodiversity are so difficult to calculate plausibly, the charges levied for 
licences are viewed as arbitrary. Therefore they are judged insufficiently attuned to the 
particular externalities that can occur as a result of the activity for which the fee is levied.  
 
One illustration is with water licence fees. Within the national water resource strategy, 
catchment management guidelines for each catchment area are designed only once the 
reserve capacity for that area is determined. Resource quality objectives such as the 
amount of water flow needed to sustain riverine ecosystems are based on such 
determinations. But these considerations are not explicitly provided for in the pricing 
strategy of the relevant section 56.354  
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 Water licence fees are provided for under section 41 (c) of the NWA. There are also additional charges 
provided for in the cases of renewal (section 52 (2) (a)) and late application for compulsory water licenses 
(section 44).  
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 Regulations read together with the MLRA provide for fees to be charged for commercial fishing rights 
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352
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emission licences. 
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 This statement refers back to the assertion made in the section on ‘incentives that create markets’, that 
externalities are usually extremely difficult to quantify convincingly. In this regard fees could be too high, 
too low, as well as failing to distinguish between differential environmental impacts. 
354
 Section 56 (3) provides for the differentiation in water pricing between only (i) geographic areas, (ii) 
categories of water use and (iii) water users.  
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Yet the costs associated with the indirect loss of habitat through decreasing water 
availability in a catchment basin arise externally to these provisions of the section. A 
decrease in a region’s biodiversity is an environmental cost integrally linked with water 
availability, but it is not in itself a consideration easily incorporated into a pricing system. 
Accordingly water licences should be allocated by pricing only once non-use value 
services are provided with a proportion of the water reserve adequate for their 
sustainability.355   
 
Product Taxes  A main theme in this thesis is that charges or taxes need to be attached to 
products in order to reflect in their prices the environmental impact associated with their 
production processes.356 The activities for which the product taxes are levied generally 
modify habitats357 and therefore impact indirectly on biodiversity. Because these impacts 
have no value thrown up by the market they are difficult to track and as social costs 
cannot be readily inserted into the prices of products that do have a market value.358  
 
Product taxes applied currently in South Africa occur in the transport, electricity and 
water sectors.359 The initial intention behind their introduction was the raising of revenue, 
not environmental protection.360 Therefore scope exists to improve both conservation 
outcomes as well as the behavioural motivation these incentive-creating taxes currently 
provide. Taxing environmental bads (like pollution) and reducing taxes on goods (like 
labour) is termed the double-dividend-hypothesis. 361  
 
These dove-tailing objectives can be concurrently achieved here, where an improvement 
in environmental quality can be secured (the first dividend) simultaneously with an 
increased efficiency in the tax-system (the second dividend). There is a degree of 
disagreement as to how this can be brought about.362 The result would be to minimise the 
burden of taxes on affected sectors while ensuring efficient behavioural incentives apply 
to achieve environmental objectives. 
 
An example is the continual rise in the real price of liquid fuel in South Africa in recent 
decades. As a result increasing numbers of people are discouraged from using their 
private vehicles as much as they are used to.363 In consequence the overall national 
emission quantity is likely to have been marginally lowered. In economic theory carrots 
                                                 
355
 Even though this needs to be based on crude estimates, the biodiversity crises currently experienced 
indicates that this nevertheless may be a necessary measure.  
356
 Charges here can be imposed on inputs to economic activities as a means to indirectly control the 
adverse environmental impacts resulting. 
357
 For instance, product charges can be levied on batteries or different forms of packaging like plastic bags 
which, if not accounted for, could end up in an ecosystem and diminish biodiversity. 
358
 Effectively the taxes are imposed on the harmful processes by which the valued products are produced, 
through schemes like deposit refund systems and differentiated tariffs for waste related services.  
359
 See Appendix 1. 
360
 National Treasury Paper (supra note 264) at 9. 
361
 National Treasury Paper (supra note 264) at 10. 
362
 National Treasury Paper (supra note 264) at 11. 
363
 People may prefer to ride bicycles and take public transport than spend extra money on fuel. This is an 
untested presumption. 
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are considered cheaper than sticks. This means that agents acting out of perceived self 
interest when the right incentives are created for them impose fewer resource costs on 
society than when they have to be regulated to do the right thing. Product taxes are not 
explicitly environmental in the example of a fuel levy but in the way they operate they 
are in potential a means to an environmental goal. The current demand side levy on fuel 
stands at ten cents per litre.364 This could hypothetically be pushed upwards to stimulate 
the development of environmentally efficient fuel technology and reduce further the use 
of private vehicles.  
 
In theory product taxes could be extended to numerous other resource sectors as long as 
perverse incentives are not created by accident. For instance, product taxes could be 
imposed on various other fuels or harmful substances that contribute to environmental 
externalities such as coal, methane and pesticides. In fact product charges could be 
attached to a large array of other market goods. The key objective in doing this would be 
to push down demand for them and stimulate more sustainable processes and products as 
well as various forms of recycling.365   
 
User Charges   User charges are imposed on the private sector through levying a fee for 
providing certain services and resources from the public sector such as electricity, waste 
collection and water supply. They can also be imposed on public access to protected 
areas. User charges have similar applicability to private biodiversity conservation as the 
three disincentive devices discussed already. They motivate more prudent consumption 
of resources and awareness regarding harmful inputs into the environment. Thus they can 
function as a vehicle to put a price on certain services that may have direct or indirect 
impacts on biodiversity. They can also influence wider economic behaviour, being that of 
other economic agents, as the charge imposed on resource users and producers enters the 
market as data for decision-making.366  
 
User charges to serve a variety of purposes are found in the regulatory frameworks of a 
number of national jurisdictions around the world.367 In South Africa the dominant uses 
they apply to368 are waste collection charges imposed on a local government level, water 
provision charges369 and electricity charges.370  Because water is a scarce resource in 
                                                 
364
 See http://www.dme.gov.za/pdfs/energy/liquidfuels/dsml_levy.pdf (on 24 December, 2007). 
365
 Options in extending the use of product charges are recognised by the National Waste Management 
Strategy (1999) (http://www.environment.gov.co.za/ProjProg/waste.html) , National Waste Management 
Strategy Implementation Programme (1999) (http://www.environment.gov.co.za/ProjProg/waste.html)  and 
the Action Plan for Waste Minimization and Recycling (1999) 
(http://www.environment.gov.co.za/ProjProg/WasteMgmt/waste.html)  
366
 User charges have to be estimated using market data, together with non-market cost components, so they 
are not wholly determined by market functioning. 
367
 For an overview see The Political Economy of Environmentally Related Taxes (2006) Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development; Environmental Fiscal Reform: What Should be Done and How 
to Achieve It (2005). 
368
 That is, the charges that raise the highest amount of revenue.  
369
 See the Pricing Strategy for Water Use Charges (GN 1353 Government Gazette 20615 of 12 November 
1999) established under the NWA in relation to use of water resources. 
370
 The Electricity Act (41 of 1987) imposes a set of electricity tariffs that are extremely low. Paterson and 
Winstanley “Improving the approach to biodiversity conservation” (supra note 296) make the point that 
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South Africa, user charges to reflect this state of affairs would strengthen the incentive 
for water users to economise as well as to innovate in order to decrease consumption.371 
This would mean more water is available to offset negative externalities so as to maintain 
biodiversity.  
 
Extending the utility of disincentives  What is socially optimal is for private users of 
resources to be continually conscious of the impact their behaviour has on the 
environment, and therefore of their obligations stipulated by law. But a second best 
alternative is for positive rewards to be incorporated into the design of, for example, 
water pricing strategies and effluent charge systems,372 in order to motivate conserving 
behaviour in private sector water users.  
 
It is important to note that for user charges to operate effectively as disincentives they 
need to encourage private organisations to go beyond the minimal thresholds prescribed 
by legislation as compliant. To achieve this, in some manner rewards need to be 
incorporated into the operation of user charges. These require clear definition and 
accurate estimation within different resource sectors. 
 
Taxes with differentially higher rates can be imposed on activities that do not adopt the 
most practicable environmental option.373 By contrast, if users engage in economic 
pursuits that voluntarily avoid inflicting environmental harm, then charge reductions may 
be given to encourage such decisions.374 For instance, the water pricing strategies 
contained in the NWA provide for this possibility.375  
 
Other practical examples would be if a farmer is intentionally and voluntarily decreasing 
use of pesticides and producing organic fruit, thereby lowering the level of durable 
pollutants introduced into inland water reserves. The water management institution 
authorised to collect charges for water use in the catchment area could reward such 
voluntary action by reducing the unit prices that the farmer pays. 376 Another instance 
                                                                                                                                                 
this is for two interrelated reasons. Firstly, South Africa has a disproportionately high reliance on coal 
compared to the rest of the world. Secondly, this pricing strategy does not reflect the externalities that such 
a tendency entails. 
371
 Increasing the productivity of the water user through technological innovation would also be an effect.  
372
 Reference to Section 56 of the NWA is included here as the framework it dictates seems particularly 
flexible. 
373
 These, like certain kinds of mining, are production strategies not sympathetic to biodiversity 
conservation. Mining is particularly relevant as the MPRDA does not provide legislated mechanisms to 
ensure that efforts are made to reduce adverse effects. 
374
 Reductions in licence fees for example. 
375
 Section 56 (4) (b) (i) states that pricing strategies can differentiate between different types of water uses 
on the basis of ‘the manner in which the water is taken, supplied, discharged or disposed of…’ and 
‘whether the use is consumptive or non-consumptive…’. Further, a pricing formula for specific charges 
scaled against volume of water used is permitted to differentiate between ‘different water users’ 
(56(3)(a)[iii]) and ‘different categories of water use’ (56(3)(a)[ii]).   
376
 Such a provision is efficient because showing environmental awareness in the selection of pesticides 
used can also exert a significant influence on environmental performance. The same encouragement can be 
provided to a water user who constantly under-uses an allocated quota. Accordingly, Section 56 (6) (b) 
states that the pricing strategy for water use charges may consider incentives to ‘…reduce detrimental 
impacts on water resources’. 
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would be if an industrial activity is using recycled instead of new inputs like paper. The 
industrial company could be granted recognition for such voluntary mitigation, perhaps 
through a reduction on a product tax depending on the administrative feasibility at this 
micro-level.377  
 
Weaknesses of licence fees, product taxes and user charges  Monopoly power is a 
challenging concern. Most established companies are likely to have adequate financial 
resources to pay charges that are raised on environmental grounds, whereas smaller 
companies may have less financial reserves to pay higher charges and still compete with 
the larger companies. A situation would then result where product charges are 
advantageous to large companies in that they operate as mechanisms tilting the balance 
against competition in the market. This could have a perverse effect. Larger companies 
could intentionally impact negatively on a natural resource in order to force competitors 
out of the market, assuming that charges are uniform industry-wide. If government is led 
to increase product charges for all resource-using companies, then conceivably 
monopolies could strengthen in this way. It is difficult a priori for policy-makers to judge 
the realism of this possibility. 
 
This scenario for natural resource use is also applicable to effluent and disposal charges. 
The actions of certain companies may trigger an impetus for authorities to raise the 
permit requirements for activities that cause pollution as a by-product, thereby forcing 
smaller producers out of the market. 
 
A reasonable presumption in most systems is that taxes obtained by the government are 
earmarked for addressing the specific environmental destruction that results from 
production in the sectors on which the charges are levied. But this needs precision in 
order to evaluate whether user charges deal adequately with externalities from particular 
activities. If revenue from charges flows instead to the general fiscus then one presumes 
that disincentive instruments put in place are not performing acceptably the function for 
which they are designed.378  
 
In companies operating in lax jurisdictions, charge systems may be perverse for 
biodiversity conservation. Where the income generated from charges is channelled by 
governments into the national budget rather than into ameliorative actions, then negative 
net effects on the environment are a relevant concern. One solution conducive to 
sustainability objectives would be to redirect the generated funds back into other 
restoration schemes, but there have to be in place legal, or possibly even constitutional, 
safeguards that this will be the preferred outcome.  
 
                                                 
377
 In international environmental law, the underlying compensation principle is more complex. It may 
involve importing countries illegitimately imposing production restrictions on exporting countries. Though 
not directly relevant here, this analogy to public-private sector negotiations within national boundaries is 
nonetheless suggestive.  
378
 On this note it is worrying that fiscal authorities are opposed to earmarking taxes for environmental 
purposes, the reason given is that it puts stresses on the budget process: see the National Treasury Paper 
(supra note 264) at 101. 
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One way of achieving this would be if charges are paid into a designated fund so that the 
authorities administering the fund earmark payment receipts for particular environmental 
schemes. Henderson (1995)379 notes that taxes levied on environmental goods and 
services are legitimately regarded as a fiscal incentive for environmental protection only 
where the revenue is applied to support such services.380 If this is not the case 
environmental taxes like pollution taxes, which can raise significant amounts of revenue 
in economies where national output is disproportionately resource-based,381 could just be 
another means for raising general state funding revenue and in addition are subject to 
underhand activities in the political process.  
 
Impacts on the broader economy are a further concern. Loss of state revenue resulting 
from environmental taxes that cause a lowered activity rate may translate into loss of 
significant numbers of employment opportunities in the public sector. If environmental 
taxes are to be effective as well as enduring, the value of their conservation gains has to 
be balanced against socio-economic development objectives foregone when they inhibit 
production. Conservation goals are intended to dove-tail with income generation as 
prescribed in most natural resource legislation. But once again the estimation difficulty, 
and wide error margins in the valuation of environmental benefits like higher biodiversity 
conservation, is a major limitation. 
 
The distributional impact of use charges across different income groups is yet a further 
concern because it is a difficult task to anticipate impacts accurately at the micro-level. 
For instance, defining poverty and measuring changes in its incidence remains a source of 
dissension amongst government and private statisticians as well as economists in South 
Africa. This was clearly evidenced in the closing months of 2007.382 In addition, the fact 
that certain companies can be excluded from the market because they cannot afford to 
pay high user fees also means that competition in the market for user rights will decline. 
Consequently such markets will be thinner – with fewer participants – and not as active 
when measured by the volume of transactions in a period of time. The net effect can be 
lowered efficiency and probably lowered equity outcomes.    
 
Another criticism of direct regulation in environmental protection is that it tends to be 
inefficient under certain circumstances.383 User charges illustrate this criticism well. If 
predefined standards are set for acceptable pollution then polluters are all expected to 
adhere to the same standards. Yet the cost of adhering to the standards set may differ 
                                                 
379
 P G W Henderson ‘Fiscal Incentives for Environmental Protection- Conceptual Framework’ (1995) 
South African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy vol 1 55 
380
 As discussed below, a key criticism of market-based incentive devices used to achieve environmental 
goals instead of direct regulation is that there is lower assurance that the environmental goals will be 
achieved. For example Kidd “Criminal sanctions” (supra note 24), Wilkie “Incentives Canada” (supra note 
29) and James “Australian Incentives” (supra note 37) amongst other sources. 
381
 The Economist (US) (8 August 1992). 
382
 This refers to the dispute between the South African institute of race relations and the Presidency about 
the extent of poverty reduction achieved in recent years. 
383
 S E Gaines and R A Westin  Taxation for Environmental Protection: a Multinational Legal Study (supra 
note 280). 
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radically from one producer of pollution to another. User charges, in principle but 
perhaps not in practice, have the potential to be tailored to address this problem. 
 
The fees levied have to serve as a deterrent to polluters and resource users but in order for 
product charges to do this they need to be high enough to impose financial loss and spur 
behavioural change by enterprises and other organisations in the broad field of natural 
resource use. When levied on companies with large contingency budgets, the product 
charges may often not be high enough for the purpose.384  
 
There have been concerns raised also over the proportion of total costs accruing to 
society as a whole that should on various grounds be borne by the community as a whole. 
For instance, Henderson (1995) points out that the costs of administering user-charges 
should not be borne entirely by the user but a portion should be met by the broader tax-
paying population as they have a preponderant interest in natural resources being 
effectively regulated.385 But this gives rise to the potential problem that individuals 
contributing towards an environmental objective – the average tax-payer - are mostly not 
responsible for the pollution or resource degradation (for which amelioration) ends up 
being paid. This practice contravenes the polluter-pays-principle. Gaines and Westin 
(1991)386 refer to a ‘coarse kind of justice’ when examining the obligations placed on 
current resource users to pay for past polluters’ activities. This line of reasoning is 
familiar to South Africans. Recent implementation of policies like affirmative action in 
the pursuit of re-distributive or transformation objectives illustrates that the present 
government would find little fault with this logic.      
 
 
4.2 Information incentives 
 
Information incentives – access to new kinds and sources of dedicated knowledge about 
the environment - can be extremely influential tools for biodiversity conservation. But 
this will vary in accordance with the sector in which they are deployed, as well as with 
the specific mechanisms used to implement them. If one types a set of word cues like 
‘organic produce’, ‘recycled packaging’ and ‘genetically modified crop traceability’ into 
a South African search website, the quantity and nature of the positive responses one gets  
evidences how powerful new sources of information are becoming.  
 
Information incentives can be categorised by the way they operate and the avenues of 
communication they use to mould behaviour. What drives the use of information as a 
source of motivation for behaviour change is the collection and public distribution of 
                                                 
384
 This possibility is quite evident in international marine pollution law where the limits on financial 
liability for oil spills are frequently too low to pay for realistic levels of remedial action. Consequently 
there is minimal motivation for oil companies to go beyond the technical regulations set by MARPOL 
73/78 (International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships, 1973, as modified by the 
Protocol of 1978 relating thereto) and make their tankers more secure than is required by international law.  
385
 Henderson “Fiscal incentives- the way forward” (supra note 274) at 157. 
386
 S E Gaines and R A Westin  Taxation for Environmental Protection: a Multinational Legal Study (supra 
note 280). This quotation is cited in Henderson “Fiscal incentives- the way forward” (supra note 274). 
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information. State providers disseminate information to nurture and develop specific 
relationships. Two are particularly important. Firstly, the relationship between the private 
producer and the consumer is mediated through the use of labelling, being new 
information about the commodity. Both buyers and sellers behaviour can be shaped by 
this device. Secondly, the relationship between the private producer and the government 
in the flow of information both ways is vital in the case of environmental reporting, 
particularly where market as well as state failure is inherent.  
 
4.2.1 Environmental reporting 
 
Reporting is a method of placing an obligation on enterprises to provide responsible 
authorities with information about the environmental impact of their actions. It conveys 
to the state evidence that a certain level of environmental protection has or has not been 
instituted by the enterprise. The means of reporting387, as the lens through which the 
environmental performance is evaluated, is a central influence shaping the flow of this 
information. In consequence standardisation in methods of environmental reporting is 
essential. Increased efficiency in reporting mechanisms equates with decreasing 
monitoring responsibility and thus lowered administrative costs for the state. 
 
Environmental reporting is relevant to biodiversity conservation by providing a means 
through which the biodiversity status of a natural resource like land or water can itself be 
used as a positive instrument. Private entities can use information about their 
conservation activities as a vehicle, first, to achieve market related advantages over 
competitors, and second, to improve their conservation reputations with the state.388 The 
usefulness of the reporting activity depends on the nature of the information that the 
enterprise conveys. Given the growth of environmental awareness in all societies it is 
plausible that organisations increasingly compete to be in good standing with watchdog 
authorities. If widespread there is a key motivating factor for them to invest in 
biodiversity conservation. It reflects positively in their performance reports, which 
ultimately play a critical role in how companies develop reputations in the eyes of 
regulatory bodies, their work-forces as well as customers. 
 
In terms of management, provision for reporting appears in most environmental sectors in 
South Africa including protected areas,389 biodiversity,390 minerals,391 and veld fires.392 
Conversely, information provision can operate also as a disincentive device because 
                                                 
387
 In other words, the regulations or laid-down guidelines which reports need to meet. 
388
 This could precipitate the activation of related rewards like regulatory incentives.  
389
 Section 43 (3) (b) of the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act (10 of 2004) states 
that annual reports need to be submitted for designated protected areas. 
390
 Under the Biodiversity Act, the Minister can make regulations for reporting obligations in bioregional 
plans (section 41), biodiversity management plans (section 45 (b)) and biodiversity management 
agreements (section 44). 
391
 The MPRDA provides for annual reporting responsibilities to be built into the design of environmental 
management plans and environmental management programmes applicable to the holders of mining rights 
and mining permits under Section 39. 
392
 Chapter 3 of the National Veld and Forest Fire Act (101 of 1998) provides for the communication of fire 
danger ratings by designated organisations (section 10). Section 11 provides further that the organisations 
would get paid for the provision of such information. 
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reporting responsibilities are triggered through emergency incident393 and ‘duty of care’ 
type provisions394  in natural resource legislation. Failure to report results in imposed 
costs can trigger criminal sanctions.  
 
Where guidelines for performance reporting vary between municipalities, provinces and 
nation states, this implies that the information conveyed by organisations can vary too. 
Thus the state can obtain inconsistent judgements about companies’ environmental 
performance because the environmental report itself – for an industry or sector - is 
dependent on each company’s interpretation of the reporting guidelines.   
 
4.2.2 Labelling and Marketing 
 
The bringing into being of private conservation organisations, and the agreements needed 
between all decision-takers that they entail, sets the stage for the use of labelling and 
marketing devices. Labelling is an important means of uniting private producers through 
a set of common principles or behaviour criteria allowing them to use a specific label on 
their products. The policy intention is to encourage enterprises to adopt programmes and 
to become members of organisations that have positive impacts on biodiversity.  
 
The unification of enterprises through the common pursuit of more environmentally 
sustainable practises is highly likely to foster the retention of biodiversity. Incentives for 
farmers – as enterprises - to become involved with conservation organisations and to 
initiate conservation agreements would arise in the market-place395  if environmentally 
benign products are identified to consumers.396 For instance, if the labelling on a 
particular product indicates that its producer is a member of a ‘regional conservation 
committee’,397 it signifies that the production process is conducted in an environmentally 
sustainable way.398  
 
Labelling has three functions in biodiversity conservation. First, as mentioned above, it 
acts as an incentive reward to producers in that they get higher prices for their products 
by obtaining access to niche markets containing discerning buyers. Secondly, eco-
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 Section 30 (3) of NEMA provides for the responsible person to ‘…report through the most effective 
means reasonably available (a) the nature of the incident, (b) any risks posed by the incident to public 
health, safety and property, (c) the toxicity of substances or by-products released by the incident…’ I refer 
here to NEMA as it is the general framework law within which emergency incident and duty of care 
provisions in the NWA, MPRDA and the Biodiversity Act were moulded.  
394
 For instance, Section 28 (4) (a) of NEMA states that if a Duty of Care has been triggered the state may 
direct relevant persons to ‘investigate, evaluate, and assess the impact of specific activities and report 
thereon’.  
395
 The marketplace is the institutional means through which goods, services and money move between 
buyers and sellers. As such it comprises the nucleus or centre of a system allocating resources via 
information conveyed by channels of demand and supply.   
396
 Labelling could be a means to disseminate information into the public domain about an organisation’s 
objectives and about the goals of its individual members. Consumers are able to identify themselves with 
these objectives through buying eco-labelled products. 
397
 Provided for by CARA (Section 16). 
398
 Labels containing information about environmental performance can reward producers in that they add 
value to the product itself enabling such enterprises to increase the prices of the product. 
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labelling is a useful tool for biodiversity conservation as it is an aid in putting market-
prices on ecosystem services that otherwise would not be subject to valuation. Thirdly, 
labelling that identifies a commodity with a specific regional organisation is a means of 
tracing such products back to their source once they have entered regional or national 
markets.  
 
Labelling is similar to reporting devices in that it is a provider of information but to a 
different audience. Where reporting of regulatory compliance is about projecting an 
image of high environmental performance by a producer in the eye of the relevant 
authority, labelling does so in the eye of the discriminating consumer or service-user. 
Consumers can obtain information regarding the behaviour of a producer via the contents 
of a so-called eco-label,399 in that such labels can be extended beyond food products to 
the provision of services with environmental dimensions. Labelling schemes currently in 
operation in South Africa include the Biodiversity and Wine Initiative (the BWI),400 the 
sustainability index,401 as well as numerous other recycled packaging and organic 
produce ventures.   
 
The utility of labelling to achieve conservation goals does however need evaluation at the 
national level where policy instruments are devised and tested. For instance, some 
minimal degree of consumer environmental awareness is a pre-requisite to create 
consumer demand. Such awareness is therefore a critical driver of eco-labelling in acting 
as an incentive to producers.  
 
Yet in many developing countries with low per capita incomes, causes of human stress 
like acquiring access to food are problems for large proportions of the population. Thus 
environmental considerations in consumption fade in significance. In these circumstances 
information about production and processing methods is likely to be a less useful tool 
than direct regulation to obtain support for conservation from private decision-takers. 
There is clearly a growing popularity of green products in societies where individual 
consumers have more resources. This may continue to drive the implementation of eco-
labelling as a biodiversity conservation tool if it is a function of growing per capita 
income. This is a plausible but untested conjecture.  
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 It is therefore a critical factor in the moulding of producer behaviour towards sustainability. 
400
 The BWI is an association of wine producers where the individual members have established a common 
environment across their properties within which biodiversity best practices can be adopted in ways that 
assist the South African wine industry. The dovetailing between biodiversity protection and marketing 
implies a mutually beneficial relationship between BWI members and their units of environment as 
members choose voluntarily to implement biodiversity guidelines in their production practices 
401
 The Johannesburg Stock Exchange launched a Sustainability Index in 2003. The Index lists companies 
that pursue environmentally sustainable business practices and rewards them through higher share values. 
Further, listed companies can use the fact that they are listed to identify themselves with fellow members 
through product labelling. The intention is to encourage private sector companies to adopt programmes that 
possess biodiversity protection as one objective.     
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4.3 Regulatory incentives 
 
Regulatory incentives are currently absent from South African environmental legislation. 
To avoid extensive discussion in the abstract rather than about practice then this section 
will be kept brief. 
 
Regulatory incentives can be used to encourage and reward voluntary initiatives by 
organisations or individuals that have as a central objective, minimising biodiversity 
impacts resulting from their own activities. Even though a range of self-regulatory and 
co-regulatory mechanisms have been made available in the last ten years in South Africa, 
many of which are relevant to private biodiversity conservation and were mentioned 
above, none have been implemented.402 They can be used to motivate enterprises to go 
beyond base-line compliance with the regulatory conditions applicable, that is, to adopt 
practices leading to conservation outcomes higher in extent, depth and value.403 What 
influences drive individuals and companies to modify their behaviour can range on a 
spectrum from positive to negative in their effects.  
 
Negative examples or disincentives would be industries that anticipate future statutory 
impositions of stricter limits, and in response they modify their technological standards in 
order to offset or pre-empt future cost increases. Positive incentives could be the 
authorities relaxing their monitoring of certain organisations – for a range of reasons like 
community empowerment - or giving preferential treatment to certain applicants in the 
processing of permit applications so as to reward exemplary environmental performance.  
 
Modifying or deferring regulations for enterprises that take conservation actions without 
regulatory prompting, and show high levels of environmental performance and awareness 
in the process, is a positive incentive device discussed extensively in the literature.404 The 
reward to the beneficiary can involve relaxation of the regulatory burden in another 
sphere of legislative consideration, like the number of black staff and women the 
company is obliged to hire under other legislation.405 However such trade-offs or cross-
cutting considerations need careful weighing-up in South Africa, one concern being the 
capacity of the relevant authorities to administer such complexity in enforcement. 
Although contributing a serious political dimension to the implementation of regulatory 
incentives in South Africa, their effectiveness may be limited.   
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 W Scholtz ‘Introduction of Environmental Management Co-operation agreements in South Africa’ 
(2004) 11 (1) South African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 31-52; N Acutt ‘Perspectives on 
Corporate Responsibility: the South African Experience with Voluntary Initiatives’ (2003) 10 (1) South 
African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 1-20. 
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 One example would be an industrial company taking measures to produce cleaner discharge water than 
is prescribed by the effluent discharge thresholds set by the relevant water authority. 
404
 Regulatory incentives are being implemented in Australia and Canada (see Wilkie “Incentives Canada” 
(supra note 29) and James “Australian incentives” (supra note 37)) Information on the rationale behind 
relaxing regulations for high environmental performance is implemented in the ‘Performance Track 
Program’ in Canada (see http: //www.epa.gov/performancetrack/index.htm.).  
405
 The proposal to make up a deficit in one sphere of concern by a gain in a different one is alluded to in 
the Margo Commission Report. The context of discussion is fiscal incentives. The Report states that in 
principle a fiscal incentive lowering revenue in one sphere like the environment should be paid for by an 
additional receipt for the fiscus elsewhere in the system.  
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Wilkie 406 describes how regulatory incentives designed to be negative in effect can be 
used to induce environmental performance in enterprises that goes beyond basic 
compliance levels. She uses the example of prospective new regulations to show how 
they can serve as incentives to organisations to comply voluntarily in advance of more 
stringent provisions (if the looming regulations are more stringent than the current ones). 
Regulatory uncertainty and sudden additional compliance costs are thus avoided if 
private action is taken prior to the regulations in prospect coming into force.  
 
However, it is quite possible that an incentive lever of this kind could work in the 
opposite direction too. If more stringent regulations are looming ahead for a particular 
industry, this could serve perversely as a motive for enterprises to engage in more 
environmentally destructive activities within the current regulatory compliance range, in 
order to profit before the more stringent regulations come into force. Current 
development of the coastal zone in South Africa is an example of this tendency. Many 
developers are rushing to get EIAs approved for strips of the South African coastline 
before the Integrated Coastal Management Draft Bill comes into force.407 This legislation 
will formally protect many of the ecological resources in the coastal zone currently not 
recognised under the Sea Shore Act (21 of 1935).    
 
Resources are required for the administration of regulatory incentives put into effect by 
new statutes. Although statutory changes may operate as incentives for enterprises to take 
anticipatory measures they are unlikely to fulfil only this function. Voluntary private 
conservation action that responds to statutory change should be seen as a by-product 
within a broader shift in environmental management practice.  
 
The commitment of government to make institutional changes408 also raises significant 
cost considerations. Resources are needed for making operational the regulatory 
incentives brought into being through statutory change. Generally, state resource 
limitations make the introduction of regulatory innovations quite limited in South Africa.  
 
One other significant consideration too is public perception regarding the relaxation of 
regulations in certain situations in order to reward environmental performance. If a 
particular regulatory incentive device is assessed negatively by the public it is unlikely to 
get political support either. For realism in all cases, regulatory incentives should be used 
to strengthen the current system by giving it flexibility and streamlining its 
implementation in the private sector.   
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 Wilkie “Incentives Canada” (supra note 29). 
407
 J Davenport ‘EIA delay’ (2006) Engineering News (26) September 8-14 points out that this is a causal 
factor in the vast backlog in EIA processing. 
408
 Institutional changes, according to Wilkie “Incentives Canada” (supra note 29), include changing 
attitudes and operations, but these are potentially expensive. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The use of incentive-based instruments combined with a selection of regulations 
promises advantages in stimulating private biodiversity conservation in South Africa. By 
hypothesis, incentive levers can evade the compliance and enforcement deficiencies that 
are evidenced by the traditional approach to biodiversity conservation. The positive 
features of the newer devices described in this paper include their flexibility in design and 
use; their capacity to elicit voluntary action rather than responses to coercion; their 
promise of more economic efficiency in minimising cost or maximising benefit, or gains 
both ways; their ability to facilitate and promote innovation; and, above all, their 
potential to offset market failures, partially or wholly.  
If such claims are correct, incentive devices can relieve the regulatory burden imposed on 
environmental authorities by command-and-control policies. Similarly, the administrative 
capacity and resource constraints mentioned throughout this paper as facing the 
authorities charged with environmental protection in South Africa might be relieved by 
adopting these policy alternatives. In general, these new proposals do not require large 
allocations of public resources. 
Yet it is also evident that while these optional instruments have been presented here as an 
entire range, some tools are more likely to be useful than others. Certain kinds have been 
implemented locally on an experimental basis, while others have been applied in limited 
contexts. So both categories may or may not be feasible to extend. A sub-set exists only 
prospectively, not yet implemented despite their assessment as promising. Yet a further 
grouping has proved perverse, in the sense of being as likely to decrease as to advance 
biodiversity conservation. So although the array of tools available in South Africa to 
influence human choices involving conservation action is comprehensive, considerable 
scope exists for their refinement and extension in the agenda of policy research. 
 
Given the severity of the biodiversity problem in South Africa and the urgency attaching 
to remedial action, incentive devices that are judged feasible to implement immediately 
must merit the most attention. Significant obstructions to use do exist, not only in South 
Africa but in developing countries in general. For instance, the levels of consumers’ 
environmental awareness and their purchasing power above certain thresholds appear to 
be prerequisite conditions for information-based incentives to become effective. 
Similarly, the likelihood of a market developing in South Africa within which tradable 
resource use rights can be exchanged efficiently is deemed by some commentators409 to 
be slim. This stems from the comparatively small size of the country’s industrial and 
commercial sectors. On the other hand, positive arguments can be mounted for using 
existing markets wherever they appear suitable as implementing mechanisms. In addition, 
noting the flaws that attach to direct subsidies,410 tax benefits were examined specifically 
in this paper to show their potential use in the environmental sphere.  
 
                                                 
409
 Stauth et al (supra note 22) at 44. 
410
 National Treasury Paper (supra note 264) at 89. It is noted that subsidies in general do not conform to 
the Polluter-Pays Principle, and that their use can lead to significant economic distortions. 
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In summary, policy innovations exist as hypotheses that promise gains in private 
biodiversity conservation in South Africa. In principle there is a comprehensive range of 
instruments available, so the chances of finding a sub-set applicable locally are 
reasonably high. Refining what is currently on offer in the literature (1) to circumvent 
foreseeable problems in implementation, as well as (2) to maximise social welfare given 
the resource and capacity constraints faced by our national authorities, encapsulates the 
major challenge.  
 
At the present time what is needed is an integration of considerations that aim to achieve 
a complex mix of state objectives that are social, political, economic and environmental 
in kind. This is formidable. But only if such integration is successful can private 
conservation be embraced fully in policy formation, so that environmental preservation 
advances in a sustainable manner on the national scale. This goal is what all 
environmental disciplines, not the least environmental law, have as their determining 
impulse. 
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Appendix 1: Overview of environmentally-related taxes and charges in South Africa (2005/2006) 
 
 
 
Source: National Treasury Paper (supra note 287) at 34. 
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